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Trust is a key feature of social interactions and central to interpersonal cooperation. Acts of 
trust are not only pivotal aspects of interpersonal cooperation and group cohesion, they also 
have important consequences for individual health and life expectancy. However, which social 
qualities of others foster trust, how individuals learn whom to trust, and how the brain integrates 
this information for optimal behavioral updating is yet unexplored. Here, I will outline two lines 
of research. On one hand, I will show the psychological and neural predictors of trust in 
different social contexts. On the other, pharmacological modulations of the neural brain 
structures involved in trust will be presented. In the first two behavioral experiments, I show 
that honesty functions as an antecedent of trustworthiness impressions and that an honest 
reputation is associated with higher trust during a future social interaction. Next, I delineate the 
neural signatures of these honesty-based trustworthiness impressions. Notably, similar to the 
behavioral effects of honesty on future trust decisions, I found that honesty-encoding brain 
regions predicted those future trust decisions, providing evidence of honesty-related brain 
regions that entail neural signal predictive of trusting behavior. Furthermore, an honest 
reputation also modulated neural responses to feedback information. Such neural modulation 
likely biases information integration during social learning. Consequently, I show in a further 
behavioral study that an honest reputation seems to indeed impair learning due to an honesty-
dependent asymmetry in information weighting. Finally, I demonstrate how the 
pharmacological modulation of brain dynamics impacts trusting behaviors leaving 
trustworthiness impressions unchanged. On the one hand, these findings shed light on how 
honesty not only increases trust in others but also hampers learning processes for optimal 
behavioral adaptation. On the other, they provide the first pharmacological evidence of how 
impression-based trust can be changed without impacting those very first trustworthiness 
 9  
impressions. I finally propose accounts that might explain the observed behavioral and neural 
patterns and outline potential directions for new studies.  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Vertrauen ist ein Hauptmerkmal sozialen Austausches und von wesentlicher Bedeutung für 
zwischenmenschliche Zusammenarbeit. Vertrauensakte sind aber nicht nur zentrale Aspekte 
zwischenmenschlicher Zusammenarbeit und des Gruppenzusammenhalts, sondern sie haben 
auch noch wichtige Folgen für die individuelle Gesundheit und Lebenserwartung. Es ist jedoch 
noch nicht erforscht, welche sozialen Eigenschaften anderer das Vertrauen fördern, wie 
Individuen lernen wem sie Vertrauen schenken sollen und wie das Gehirn solche Informationen 
für eine optimale Verhaltensanpassung integriert. Hier werde ich zwei Forschungslinien 
auslegen. Einerseits zeige ich die psychologischen und neuronalen Grundlagen von Vertrauen 
in unterschiedlichen sozialen Kontexten. Andererseits wird eine pharmakologische Modulation 
von Vertrauensakten zugrundeliegenden Hirnstrukturen dargelegt. In den ersten beiden 
Verhaltensexperimenten zeige ich, dass Ehrlichkeit einem Vertrauenswürdigkeitseindruck 
vorausgeht und dass ein Ruf, ehrlich zu sein (d.h. ehrlicher Ruf), mit höherem Vertrauen 
während einer zukünftigen sozialen Interaktion verknüpft ist. Als Nächstes stelle ich die 
Hirnmarker dieses Ehrlichkeit-basierten Vertrauenswürdigkeitseindrucks dar. Insbesondere 
fand ich heraus, dass Ehrlichkeit enkodierende Hirnregionen zukünftige 
Vertrauensentscheidungen vorhersagen, ähnlich wie die Verhaltenseffekte von Ehrlichkeit auf 
zukünftige Vertrauensentscheidungen. Dies liefert Evidenz für Ehrlichkeit zugrundeliegende 
Hirnareale, die die Vertrauensverhalten vorhersagenden Hirnsignal beinhalten. Außerdem 
wirkt sich der ehrliche Ruf eines anderen auf Feedback verarbeitende Hirnaktivierungen aus, 
was Informationsintegration während sozialen Lernens verzerren kann. In einer weiteren 
Verhaltensstudie zeige ich, dass ein ehrlicher Ruf Lernprozesse mittels einer durch Ehrlichkeit 
verursachten Asymmetrie in Informationsgewichtung zu beeinträchtigen scheint. Schließlich 
demonstriere ich, wie pharmakologische Modulation von Hirnprozessen Vertrauensverhalten 
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aber nicht Vertrauenswürdigkeitseindrücke beeinflusst. Zum einen werfen diese Erkenntnisse 
ein Licht darauf, wie Ehrlichkeit das Vertrauen in andere verstärkt, aber auch wie dies 
Lernprozesse für optimale Verhaltensanpassung erschweren kann. Zum anderen liefern sie 
erste pharmakologische Evidenz dafür, wie auf Eindrücken basierendes Vertrauen verändert 
werden kann, ohne Vertrauenswürdikeitseindrücke zu beeinflussen. Zum Schluss schlage ich 
Ansätze vor, die dem beobachteten Verhalten und den Hirnaktivierungsmustern eine Erklärung 
bieten, und entwerfe zukünftige Richtungen für neue Untersuchen. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1  To trust or not to trust 
Across disciplines, trust is defined as the willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive 
expectations of the intentions and behavior of another (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 
1998). Accepting some degree of vulnerability to the other is essential to trust, because the 
other’s behavior is not fully under our control and the other may thus take advantage of us 
(Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). If we want to avoid being exploited by our fellow humans, 
we might want to engage only in social interactions where we can foresee the outcomes. 
However, not only is such a degree of control and predictability utterly impossible in real-life 
interactions, it also hampers cooperation and the ability to learn from others. Cooperation is 
crucial to navigating a highly complex world. Humans cooperate for help, protection and 
support (Bicchieri, 1990; Cubitt, Gächter, & Quercia, 2017; E. Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Further, 
humans have developed a variety of social learning strategies that enable them to maximize 
their survival chances by using the knowledge and behavioral patterns of others (Kendal et al., 
2018). 
Relying on others for help, information, support and the like, may turn out to be highly 
advantageous. In particular, we might be able to exploit others’ knowledge and experience to 
improve accuracy and speed up of our decision-making. Exploiting others’ knowledge 
represents a central feature for better learning and decision strategies, as it prevents the 
implementation of more costly exploratory approaches to acquire the required information 
before making a decision or action (which may be, for instance, the way culture operates) 
(Heyes, 2016; Kendal et al., 2018). This has led to a “social bias” in information gathering (e.g., 
by taking advice from others) where individuals prefer to sample information from others over 
gathering information by themselves (Mesoudi, Whiten, & Dunbar, 2006). Although such a 
bias may improve the accuracy of our decision and boost our survival chances especially when 
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gathering information from groups of individuals (Bang & Frith, 2017; Galton, 1907), relying 
on information from others may imply less optimal choices for oneself and more vulnerability 
to the other’s exploitation when this information is itself somehow biased or comes from not 
well-intended others. 
As trust outweighs distrust, humans may have evolved to adopt trust as a default strategy 
in social interactions, accepting vulnerability to others for the sake of the advantages of social 
learning and cooperation (Cesarini et al., 2008; Oskarsson, Dawes, Johannesson, & Magnusson, 
2012; Reimann, Schilke, & Cook, 2017). At the same time, however, they may have refined 
tools to “learn” to distrust, namely, to identify untrustworthy others who need to be avoided or 
ostracized (Reimann et al., 2017; Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007; 
Williams & Sommer, 1997). This, in turn, requires an accurate estimation of the other’s 
character to make adequate predictions about the quality of the other’s information or about the 
reliability of the other’s future, cooperative behavior. 
Trust might be required both when we do not know the trustee and when we do (Fig. 
1). When the social interaction is completely anonymous (like many interactions on the 
Internet), trust relies on social norms recognized by the group and applicable to a particular 
social circumstance. In such situations, individuals trust on the assumption that the other would 
comply with a norm of fairness and reciprocity (Bellucci, Feng, Camilleri, Eickhoff, & Krueger, 
2018; Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Bicchieri, 2005, 2014). If, however, the interaction is 
not completely anonymous, individuals have access to partial information about the other and 
can form trustworthiness beliefs based on first impressions that emerge effortlessly and rapidly 
(Engell, Haxby, & Todorov, 2007; A. Todorov, 2008; A. Todorov, Baron, & Oosterhof, 2008; 
A. Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki, 2015; Alexander Todorov, Pakrashi, & 
Oosterhof, 2009). 
On the contrary, individuals can also have some knowledge about the other prior to trust. 
On the one hand, individuals can receive information indirectly from others (e.g., indirect 
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reputation). This is the case when people have information about the trustee’s previous social 
behavior or have heard about the trustee’s reputation as social partner (Delgado, Frank, & 
Phelps, 2005; Fouragnan et al., 2013; Hillebrandt, Sebastian, & Blakemore, 2011; Semmann, 
Krambeck, & Milinski, 2004). On the other, people might have the opportunity to repeatedly 
interact with the trustee over time. In this case, individuals slowly gather information via direct 
experience to form subjective, trustworthiness beliefs about the other (Bellucci, Chernyak, 
Goodyear, Eickhoff, & Krueger, 2017; I. Bohnet & Huck, 2004; Heyes, 2016; Kendal et al., 
2018; King-Casas et al., 2005; Krueger, Grafman, & McCabe, 2008; Krueger et al., 2007). 
Moreover, when individuals have the opportunity to interact over the course of multiple 
encounters, these different sources of social information can also influence each other. For 
instance, through direct experience with the other, the initial, trustworthiness beliefs based on 




 16  
Fig.1. Trusting interactions. Individuals face very different situations in which they would need to trust others. 
Individuals might be required to put their trust in either unknown or known others, namely, individuals whom 
they have no previous knowledge of or individuals whom they know. Trusting unknown others might be 
required in anonymous situations where individuals do not have the opportunity to either meet or see the trustee. 
In these cases, in order to decide whether to trust, individuals rely on the social norms recognized by the social 
group they are a member of and applicable to the particular situation they are in. When, however, the social 
interaction is not completely anonymous, individuals might have access to some (often partial) information 
about the other. In these cases, individuals can form first impressions about the trustee based on the available 
information. On the contrary, when individuals trust known others, they might face a trustee they know directly, 
for instance, through previous experience. In these cases, individuals have beliefs about the other’s 
trustworthiness that ground in the other’s direct reputation. In other cases, however, individuals might not have 
interacted with the other previously but have knowledge about the other’s trustworthiness through indirect 
reputation, for instance, because they have heard what others think of the trustee. Importantly, these different 
sources of social information might dynamically interact to form, change, revise or update trustworthiness 
beliefs about others, underlying mechanisms of trust learning. 
 
Here, I will focus in particular on impression-based trust derived from facial information 
and experience-based trust derived from direct reputation. First impressions can draw on 
different types of social information from faces (Olivola & Todorov, 2010; Sofer, Dotsch, 
Wigboldus, & Todorov, 2015; A. Todorov et al., 2015). Previous work has shown that different 
social dimensions can be inferred from faces, such as, attractiveness, competence, 
trustworthiness and dominance (A. Todorov et al., 2008; A. Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & 
Hall, 2005; A. Todorov et al., 2015). Such information is processed as quickly as 33 ms and 
can influence a variety of complex social behaviors from voting to trusting (A. Todorov, 2008; 
A. Todorov et al., 2005; Alexander Todorov et al., 2009). 
In contrast, repetitive social interactions allow abstracting behavioral patterns that 
constitute reputational priors about the other’s character and social preferences. The ABI 
model, an influential model of trust based on a cross-discipline meta-analysis of the literature 
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on trust, suggests three main factors of trustworthiness: 1) ability; 2) benevolence, and 3) 
integrity (Mayer et al., 1995). These factors induce perceptions of trustworthiness in others that 
guide social and prosocial behaviors such as advice-taking, altruistic behavior, unconditional 
kindness and reciprocity (Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov, 2006; Baumert, Schlösser, & Schmitt, 
2014; Hilbig, Thielmann, Hepp, Klein, & Zettler, 2015; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2015; Yaniv, 
2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). 
 
1.2  Taking advice 
Seeking advice from others is a highly efficient strategy through which individuals exploit 
others’ knowledge to improve their decisional outcomes (Yaniv, 2016). Sound decision-making 
is of pivotal importance to the individual because suboptimal choices are perilous to one’s 
survival chances. Individuals have been shown to take advice from different sources and make 
their decision after integrating this information. 
On the one hand, individuals have been seen to rely on their own knowledge more 
frequently and more knowledgeable individuals take less advice than less knowledgeable 
individuals––a phenomenon referred to as egocentric advice discounting (Yaniv, 2004, 2016; 
Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). However, in highly unpredictable environments, individuals 
prefer gathering more information from others, deliberately seeking to acquire knowledge about 
their past decisions and behaviors (McElreath et al., 2005). Moreover, individuals are also 
sensitive to the quality of the advice and tend to discount poor advice, suggesting that an 
accuracy maximization strategy plays a role in advice taking (Budescu & Rantilla, 2000; Yaniv 
& Kleinberger, 2000). Advice-taking behaviors are also sensitive to the social qualities of the 
adviser, so that less advice is generally taken from those who do not reciprocate in advice taking 
(Mahmoodi, Bahrami, & Mehring, 2018; McElreath et al., 2005). In sum, previous work 
suggests that individuals reach out to others less when uncertainty (about one’s decisions or the 
environment) is low and rely more strongly on what they know when making decisions. 
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However, when they do seek advice, individuals weigh up the social qualities of the adviser to 
decide whom to take advice from (Festinger, 1954). 
So far, previous work has focused on how and when advice from others affects an 
individual’s learning. However, little is known about how character traits of the adviser are 
learnt and impact the advisee’s decisions and advice-taking behavior. Of particular relevance 
are perceptions about the adviser’s trustworthiness, which might ultimately lead someone to 
decide whether to take advice and from whom. The trustworthiness of advisers is indeed central 
to many decisions in everyday life. Recently, it has been suggested that the patients’ 
trustworthiness impressions about their doctor might play a substantial role in the patient’s 
health and life expectancy (Baker et al., 2016; Pereira Gray, Sidaway-Lee, White, Thorne, & 
Evans, 2018). Higher trust in a doctor might increase patient compliance even when positive 
outcomes are not readily and clearly predictable, resulting in the long-term benefit of the 
patient. However, to date, no study has experimentally tested whether and how direct reputation 
affects trustworthiness impressions and trusting behaviors that guide advice-taking strategies 
in interactions with others. 
 
1.3  Trusting once and again: The Trust Game 
Behavioral trust has been widely investigated across contexts (from economics to psychology 
to neuroscience) using the well-established trust game (TG) (Berg et al., 1995). The TG is a 
two-player game. One of the players receives the role of investor. The other player is the trustee. 
The investor receives an initial, monetary endowment. The investor must decide whether to 
share part of this initial endowment with the trustee. In some versions of the TG, investors make 
a binary decision, namely, they can decide either to share nothing or to share half of the initial 
endowment. Other versions allow for more variability in the investor’s decisions, enabling 
investors to share any amount from nothing to the full amount. Unanimously, the investor’s 
decision is taken as a measurement of the investor’s trust. If the investor decides to share any 
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portion of the initial endowment, the shared amount of money is multiplied by the experimenter 
(generally tripled) and passed on to the trustee. The trustee can then decide whether any portion 
of the received amount should be sent back to the trustor. The trustee’s decision represents the 
trustee’s reciprocity to the investor. Either the absolute amount shared back by the trustee or its 
proportion relative to the total amount at the trustee’s disposal can be used as a measure. 
Further, two versions of this game are generally employed. In one version, investors and 
trustees interact only once (one-shot TG). In many studies employing this version, especially 
in the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) literature, participants in the role of 
investor in general play several rounds of one-shot TGs. That is, investors make repeated trust 
decisions, yet each time with a different trustee. Thus, the social interaction with each partner 
lasts per se only one round (hence, one-shot decision). In contrast, in the multi-round TG, 
investors play multiple rounds (i.e., make multiple trust decisions interacting) with the same 
trustee. Studies have also examined trusting behavior in investors and trustees playing several 
multi-round TG, that is, each partner plays multiple rounds with multiple partners. The main 
advantage of this second TG version is that it allows studying the temporal dynamics of trust 
in the course of the social interaction. This makes it possible to investigate how trust is 
established and maintained, evolves, and ultimately breaks down. 
The game has reached such popularity because it establishes a highly controlled 
environment in which a social interaction between people unfolds that has good ecological 
validity. Furthermore, the TG provides very similar results under varying conditions and across 
cultures (I. Bohnet, Greig, Herrmann, & Zeckhauser, 2008; Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Based on 
these studies, investors have been seen to consistently share around 50% of their initial 
endowment and trustees reciprocate by sending back as much as entrusted to them (C. F. 
Camerer, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Studies using the TG have shown 
that trust in others hinges on both the character and intentions of the other partner. For instance, 
individuals trust those who have a morally good character, show good intentions or are good 
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cooperators (Delgado et al., 2005; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2008; McCabe, Rigdon, & Smith, 
2003; Nelson, 2002; van 't Wout & Sanfey, 2008). 
The flexibility of the TG lends itself to study different trusting dynamics. Subjective 
impressions of others’ trustworthiness (impression-based trust) has been studied using the one-
shot TG. The investor is provided with information to elicit varying trustworthiness impressions 
prior to a trust decision. Impressions can be elicited by providing vignettes or story lines 
describing the character of the trustee. Alternatively, participants could interact with their 
partner in a previous game in which the partner’s behavior was modulated to induce 
impressions of high or low trustworthiness. Finally, impressions of trustworthiness can be 
triggered by presenting pictures of putative partners whose facial trustworthiness is manipulated 
ad-hoc. 
In contrast, trusting behaviors that rely on the learnt social character of the other (i.e., 
experience-based trust) can be studied using multi-round TG. Participants interact with each 
other repeatedly, thereby learning dynamically from each other’s decisions and which action 
may be the best one in the next encounter. Trustees’ reciprocal behaviors may be manipulated 
to examine how individuals adapt their trusting behavior to the other’s trustworthiness. In some 
cases, reciprocal behaviors differed across trustees but remained constant across time. In some 
other cases, the reciprocal behavior of a trustee changes over time. Others have examined how 
trust breaks down when healthy individuals interact with patients with social impairments who 
do not exhibit the same depth of mentalizing to form an adequate model of the partner (Anderl 
et al., 2018; Maurer, Chambon, Bourgeois-Gironde, Leboyer, & Zalla, 2018; Xiang, Ray, 
Lohrenz, Dayan, & Montague, 2012). 
 
1.4  Reinforcement learning 
Thus, beliefs about the other’s trustworthiness may be formed based on subjective impressions 
from facial information and/or on dynamic integration of new incoming information about the 
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other’s behavior that updates trustworthiness beliefs about them. Previous studies have 
suggested that cues about others’ behavior during repeated interactions are integrated via 
reinforcement learning processes. Reinforcement learning relies on prediction errors that signal 
the discrepancy between actual and expected rewards (Rudebeck, Saunders, Prescott, Chau, & 
Murray, 2013; Tsuchida, Doll, & Fellows, 2010). The Rescorla Wagner model posits that the 
prediction error reflects how much learning occurs based on the unexpected reward (i.e., 
surprise) (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). The model formalizes learning as update of the value 
ascribed to a particular stimulus V at a particular time t based on the received reward R: 
 !"# = 	&# − (#,     (1) 
 
where PEt is the prediction error at time t. The PE approximates zero when the received reward 
is close to what expected. The PE increases the more the received and expected rewards diverge. 
The PE is negative when the received reward is smaller than expected, whereas the PE is 
positive when the received reward is bigger than expected. 
The PE can be thought of as the quantity that determines how much update is needed. 
The more we learn about the associative strength between a particular stimulus and its reward 
outcomes, the less learning occurs, as the expected reward approximates the actual reward. This 
implies that our expectation (prediction) of a reward R given a stimulus S will increase in 
accuracy with a concomitant reduction of discrepancy (error). However, this value update is 
not linear but hinges on learning parameters, which affect the magnitude of the changes 
involved. In their original formulation, Rescorla and Wagner describes at least three sets of 
parameters that modulates value update (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). These were: 1) the 
stimulus salience ()), which indicates the assumption that the associative strength between 
stimulus and reward may be acquired at different rates despite equal reinforcement; 2) the 
learning rate associated with a particular stimulus (*), which indicates the assumption that the 
 22  
rate of learning depends on the type of stimulus employed; and 3) the asymptotic level of the 
associative strength (+), which describes the associative strength of the stimulus-reward pair. 
Based on these assumptions, the amount of learning that occurs for each stimulus (i.e., the 
change of stimulus value, ∆(-) can be formalized as: 
 ∆(- = 	)-*-(+- − (-).     (2) 
 
Neuronally, PEs evoke teaching signals for changing synaptic weights in dopaminergic 
neuronal networks (Sutton & Barto, 1981). Thus, similar to the mathematical formulation of 
PEs, an unexpected outcome leads to a positive neural signal, a predicted outcome to a zero 
neural signal and the absence of an expected outcome to a negative neural signal. PEs are 
encoded, among others, in the midbrain, striatum and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (W. Schultz, 
2000; W. Schultz & Dickinson, 2000). Notably, these dopaminergic brain regions show neural 
responses to rewards that depend on their predictability, suggesting that they track reward PE 
for learning. For instance, Hollerman and Schultz (1998) found that the magnitude of dopamine 
responses to a reward reflected the degree of reward predictability during individual learning. 
Responses to unexpected rewards were stronger and decreased with improved performance 
(i.e., better reward predictions). Moreover, dopamine neurons signal not only the occurrence of 
a reward but also its timing relative to expectations (Hollerman & Schultz, 1998; W. Schultz, 
2000; W. Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). 
Neuroimaging studies in humans have found similar results. A pioneering positron-
emission tomography study on stimulus-outcome associations found activations in bilateral 
OFC during the occurrence of unexpected outcomes (Nobre, Coull, Frith, & Mesulam, 1999). 
More recently, a neuroimaging study using fMRI has indicated a certain degree of neural 
differentiation in the representation of different types of PEs. In particular, while value PEs 
(related to the magnitude of an expected reward) elicit brain activations specifically in the 
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midbrain, identity PEs (related to the sensory features of an expected reward) evoke brain 
activity not only in the midbrain but also in the OFC (Howard & Kahnt, 2018). 
Reinforcement learning models were initially applied to describe how an agent learns 
the associative strength of two stimuli during instrumental learning (i.e., based on Pavlovian 
conditioning). More recently, these models have been applied to learning of other forms of 
stimulus values, such as a person’s character traits in social learning. In particular, 
reinforcement learning has been proposed to allow the formation of beliefs about another that 
ultimately inform trusting behaviors (Delgado et al., 2005; Fouragnan et al., 2013; King-Casas 
et al., 2005). Trustworthiness beliefs are dynamically updated based on feedback about the 
other’s reciprocity over multiple interactions with the partner in a TG (Chang, Doll, van 't Wout, 
Frank, & Sanfey, 2010). Similarly, in an advice-taking paradigm, participants integrate advice 
by weighting the different outcomes of the recommended and not recommended options (Biele, 
Rieskamp, & Gonzalez, 2009). 
Activity in the OFC is associated with valuation of expert advice before an advice-based 
decision  is made, suggesting that on a neural level, a reinforcement learning mechanism is 
likely involved in advice utilization (Meshi, Biele, Korn, & Heekeren, 2012). These results 
provide behavioral and neural evidence that reinforcement-learning models might be best suited 
to capture the dynamics of trust-based learning in social contexts. In particular, they might 
provide a mechanistic account to formally describe how individuals learn about another’s 
character traits and reputation before deciding whether to trust. 
 
1.5  The role of dopamine in trust 
Dopaminergic neurons are a heterogeneous group of cells situated in the diencephalon, 
mesencephalon, and olfactory bulb with a large majority localized in the ventral midbrain 
(Arias-Carrion, Stamelou, Murillo-Rodriguez, Menendez-Gonzalez, & Poppel, 2010; 
Bjorklund & Dunnett, 2007; Ikemoto, 2010). Although they make up only roughly 1% of all 
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neurons in a human brain, they play a central role in a wide range of human behaviors (Arias-
Carrion et al., 2010). Animal and human studies together with clinical investigations have 
suggested roles of the dopaminergic system in movements, goal-directed behavior, cognition, 
attention, reward and, as seen in the previous section, reinforcement learning (Boureau & 
Dayan, 2011; Cools, 2006; Cools, Nakamura, & Daw, 2011; J. P. O'Doherty, 2004; Wolfram 
Schultz, 2002). 
In social contexts, many studies have observed activations in the dopaminergic system 
for a broad variety of behaviors. For instance, activity in dopaminergic regions has been 
observed for altruism (Karns, Moore, & Mayr, 2017), charity donations (Moll et al., 2006) and 
generosity (Hackel, Doll, & Amodio, 2015). A recent fMRI study has further observed that 
activity in the striatum and OFC during generosity is associated with increased happiness 
feelings (Park et al., 2017), suggesting a central role for the dopaminergic system not only in 
prosocial behaviors but also in subjective well-being. Trust has been observed to engage 
dopaminergic regions such as the striatum and OFC as well. For instance, trust decisions with 
a social partner as opposed to a computer evoke brain activations in the putamen and ventral 
striatum. Striatal and OFC responses were further observed to reciprocated trust as opposed to 
defection of trust (Phan, Sripada, Angstadt, & McCabe, 2010; Sripada et al., 2009). 
However, the role of the dopaminergic system in such complex behaviors is yet to be 
clarified. Especially with respect to the literature on trust, the engagement of the dopaminergic 
system might be related to other cognitive mechanisms that play an essential, but lateral role in 
trusting behavior, or might be due to methodological choices of researchers, such as how trust 
is studied and operationalized. 
A pioneering hyperscanning (simultaneous dual-brain) fMRI study (King-Casas et al., 
2005) showed that even though neural signals from the caudate initially occurred after each 
repayment amount was revealed (likely reflecting reward processing), activations shifted over 
the course of the TG and began to peak before the repayment amount was revealed. Consistent 
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with prediction error signals central to reinforcement learning, these results suggest that neural 
activity in the caudate underwent a dynamic change in functional role from its early 
involvement in the response to the received reward outcome to its later involvement in the 
prediction of the reward outcome based on the investor’s actions (King-Casas et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, another fMRI study has shown that during trust decisions, individuals 
recruit prefrontal brain regions involved in mentalizing at the beginning of a social interaction 
but engage well-known dopaminergic structures in later phases (Krueger et al., 2007). Thus, 
when interacting with unknown partners, individuals rely more strongly on cognitive processes 
that aid the formation of beliefs about the partner’s character. These beliefs represent 
reputational priors about the other that are retrieved to support decisions and updated on the 
basis of prediction errors over time. Accordingly, the engagement of dopaminergic regions in 
repeated interactions with known others might reflect reinforcement learning mechanisms. 
Notably, activity in the caudate during trust decisions is dampened by both positive and 
negative moral priors, whereas the absence of a prior does not reduce brain activity in this 
region (Delgado et al., 2005; Fareri, Chang, & Delgado, 2012). These findings suggest that 
neural responses in the caudate during a decision to trust reflects a learning signal to update 
one’s behavior from feedback on the other’s actions. This learning signal is diminished when 
information about the other’s moral character is provided. A recent fMRI study has directly 
tested the hypothesis that neural signal in the striatum represents a learning mechanism related 
to updating one’s behavioral strategy in a social interaction with a trusting partner (Vanyukov, 
Hallquist, Delgado, Szanto, & Dombrovski, 2019). The authors compared the results of 
multiple computational models and showed that activity in the striatum could be best captured 
by a model that describes one’s action policy and is sensitive to counterfactual outcomes of 
one’s untaken actions. It was concluded that activity in the striatum closely tracks the success 
of one’s behavioral strategy (i.e., whether and when to trust) for learning and optimal behavioral 
adaptation to the other’s actions (Vanyukov et al., 2019). 
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Thus, when individuals focus on the consequences of a trust decision, brain regions 
signaling actual or hypothetical decision outcomes (likely related to reinforcement learning 
signals) are recruited in trusting interactions (Bellucci et al., 2017; Bellucci et al., 2018; Chang, 
Smith, Dufwenberg, & Sanfey, 2011; Delgado et al., 2005). However, creating a context in 
which participants have to evaluate the other’s character before making a trust decision might 
engage other cognitive processes that recruit a different set of brain regions associated with 
higher-order cognition. It follows that if trust draws on the social character of the other (e.g., 
whether the other is trustworthy or honest), brain regions associated with social evaluations 
(such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, VMPFC, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
DLPFC) and inferences on the other’s intentions (e.g., the posterior temporoparietal junction, 
pTPJ) should be engaged during trusting behaviors (Buckholtz et al., 2008; Cooper, Kreps, 
Wiebe, Pirkl, & Knutson, 2010; FeldmanHall et al., 2018; Tusche, Bockler, Kanske, Trautwein, 
& Singer, 2016). However, to date, evidence on the brain regions representing the other’s 
character traits (such as trustworthiness or honesty) and predictive of trust decisions is still 
missing. 
 
1.6  Limitations of the extant literature 
Both advice-taking paradigms and the different versions of the TG present some issues. On one 
hand, the quality of the advice has mainly been operationalized through the reward magnitudes 
associated with the advice (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008; Biele et al., 2009; 
Biele, Rieskamp, Krugel, & Heekeren, 2011; A. O. Diaconescu et al., 2014; Andreea O. 
Diaconescu et al., 2017; Meshi et al., 2012; Rodriguez Buritica, Heekeren, & van den Bos, 
2019; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). In other words, good, informative advice was generally 
associated with higher reward outcomes and poor, uninformative advice with smaller reward 
outcomes. 
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However, advice can be informative without it being the best or near-best option (e.g., 
advice not to do something or how to make a decision) (Dalal & Bonaccio, 2010). This 
information-reward confound may have reduced social information processing to reward 
processing in previous studies. That is, in previous studies, learning and cognitive processes 
related to estimations of reward outcome contingencies are difficult to disentangle from 
evaluations about the partner’s character, such as their competence, honesty and generosity. 
Further, in advice-taking paradigms, advisers are generally incentivized to give accurate advice 
(Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). This might have indeed preserved the face-validity of the 
experiment, but it might also have encouraged participants to track the partner’s motives 
(Behrens et al., 2008; A. O. Diaconescu et al., 2014), disincentivizing the learning of the other’s 
character. 
Similarly, in the TG, trust might be associated with other behaviors that might arise 
from causes other than the partner’s trustworthiness, such as one’s own benefits associated with 
the act of trust (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Kramer, 1999). Indeed, previous studies have observed 
that trust ceases when external incentives are no longer available or when trust leads to 
monetary losses (Jason A. Aimone & Houser, 2012; Rode, 2010). These findings indicate some 
sort of strategic, reward-driven thinking intertwined with trust decisions in the TG (C. F. 
Camerer, 2003a). 
Further, sharing behaviors in the one-shot TG might reflect cognitive mechanisms other 
than trust. For example, in many studies, investors and trustees start the game with a difference 
in monetary budget with investor being endowed with a certain monetary amount, whereas 
trustees having no monetary endowment. In this situation, investors might consider sharing out 
of other-regarding concerns (J. C. Cox, 2002; James C. Cox, 2004) or might feel obliged to 
comply with a fairness norm and share enough to counterbalance the initial inequality of money 
distribution (C. Camerer & Fehr, 2004; Dawes, Fowler, Johnson, McElreath, & Smirnov, 
2007). If trust decisions in the TG are confounded by these factors unrelated to trust, it is 
 28  
difficult to uniquely assign neural activity observed during those decisions. Thus, neural 
activations in the anterior insula in the one-shot TG might be associated with uncertainty, 
betrayal aversion or anticipation of hypothetical norm violation by the partner (Bellucci et al., 
2018; Chang et al., 2011; Engelmann, Meyer, Ruff, & Fehr, 2019). Similarly, activations in the 
striatum in the multi-round TG are as likely evoked by reward anticipation or learning 
mechanisms as by trust (Bellucci et al., 2017). 
 
1.7  Overcoming limitations 
Thus, the outstanding question is how can we disentangle trusting behaviors from factors not 
related to trust? One possible solution might be to specifically modulate participants’ 
impressions about others’ trustworthiness and investigate how such a manipulation impacts 
trust. For instance, impression-based trust can be manipulated by presenting faces that vary on 
the trustworthiness dimension. A pharmacological intervention might be employed to 
investigate how dopamine affects individual trust. This approach might be quite effective 
because previous work has already shown that trustworthiness impressions are not impacted by 
dopaminergic manipulation (Zebrowitz et al., 2018). Thus, differences in how trustworthy faces 
lead to trust decisions might be uniquely attributed to the dopaminergic modulation. 
However, when using faces, one important caveat must be addressed. Different types of 
social information can be inferred from faces such as facial attractiveness, which plays a role 
in many social behaviors like approach behaviors and partner choice (Fisher, Aron, & Brown, 
2005; Little, Jones, Penton-Voak, Burt, & Perrett, 2002; Olson & Marshuetz, 2005). Facial 
attractiveness can also explain a significant portion of variance in trusting behaviors in the TG 
(Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; R. K. Wilson & Eckel, 2006). Moreover, facial attractiveness is not 
only highly correlated with facial trustworthiness (A. Todorov, 2008; A. Todorov et al., 2008) 
but also evokes reliable neural activations in the dopaminergic system (Aharon et al., 2001). 
Yet previous work investigating impression-based trust with faces failed to control for 
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variations in facial attractiveness. Thus, although facial trustworthiness plays a role in both 
building trust in strangers and in experience-based knowledge about the other’s trustworthiness 
(Chang et al., 2010), the specific effects of facial trustworthiness on trust are yet to be explored. 
Minimizing facial attractiveness information might help investigate the peculiar effects of 
trustworthiness impressions on trust in unknown others and might allow for the investigation 
of the specific dopaminergic effects on trusting behavior. 
An alternative approach might be to induce trustworthiness impressions through a 
previous interaction with the other and use the TG later on as a read-out for the transfer effect 
of established trust (Redcay & Schilbach, 2019), thereby eliciting trustworthiness impressions 
that steer subsequent trust decisions. For example, benevolent and competent partners are 
trusted more, and recent research has shown that guilt-proneness makes people more likely to 
be trustworthy (Burnham, McCabe, & Smith, 2000; Delgado et al., 2005; Falk et al., 2008; 
Levine, Bitterly, Cohen, & Schweitzer, 2018; Toelch, Bach, & Dolan, 2014; van 't Wout & 
Sanfey, 2008). Recently, honesty has been seen to play a central role in different social 
behaviors and suggested as possible antecedent of trustworthiness perceptions (Ashton & Lee, 
2007; Ashton, Lee, & de Vries, 2014; Lee & Ashton, 2004). Hence, honesty in advice-giving 
might be used as a proxy for the other’s trustworthiness that likely guides participants’ trust 
decisions later on. 
Finally, it is of crucial to control the well-structured economic incentives inherent to 
most investigations of trust in iterative social interactions. Previous studies have shown that a 
lack of monetary incentives results in drastically dropping trust rates (J. A. Aimone & Houser, 
2011; Jason A. Aimone & Houser, 2012; J. A. Aimone & Houser, 2013; Johnson & Mislin, 
2011; Rode, 2010). At the same time, neural signals in striatal regions are elicited by the 
repayment amount sent back by the partner (Bellucci et al., 2017; Phan et al., 2010). These 
findings suggest that monetary incentives might drive participants’ behavioral choices and 
evoke the observed activations in dopaminergic regions. Thus, eliminating external incentives 
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in experimental paradigms might both help to disentangle reward-driven, strategic choices from 
social behaviors (e.g., reputational concerns and reciprocal motives) and might also provide an 
ecological setting able to capture neural correlates of real-life trust decisions. 
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Chapter 2 
2.1  Research objectives and hypotheses 
In the current dissertation, I show how subjective impressions can be harnessed to investigate 
1) how beliefs about others’ trustworthiness are updated and 2) how a pharmacologically-
induced modulation of the dopaminergic system affects trust decisions. In the first part of this 
dissertation, I describe a novel paradigm (the take advice game, TAG) designed to disentangle 
social information from reward information and to induce trusting behaviors based on others’ 
honesty. Using this paradigm, I present two behavioral studies (Chapter 4-5) followed by a 
related fMRI study (Chapter 6) and a final behavioral study in combination with computational 
modeling (Chapter 7). 
The objective of these studies is to investigate the relationships between an antecedent 
of trustworthiness perception (i.e., honesty) and trust. Given preliminary evidence that honesty 
elicits a wide array of prosocial behaviors and given the similarity of honesty to the concept of 
integrity, which has been hypothesized to lead to trust (Ashton & Lee, 2007; Ashton et al., 
2014; Ashton et al., 2004; Lee & Ashton, 2004; Mayer et al., 1995), I hypothesized that honest 
behavior might evoke trustworthiness impressions that guide later trust decisions. Furthermore, 
in the fMRI study, I addressed the issue as to whether neural patterns of trustworthiness 
impressions elicited in the TAG are also able to predict future trusting behaviors and can be 
disentangled from reward-related signal. In particular, I hypothesized that a stronger integration 
of honesty-related information about the other’s behavior should make participants more 
willing to trust. Finally, in a last behavioral study, I will show how reputational priors of 
honesty-based trustworthiness are formed and updated using a computational formalization of 
participants’ choices. As reinforcement models have previously been shown to closely capture 
social learning dynamics (Biele et al., 2009; Biele et al., 2011; Chang et al., 2010), I 
 32  
hypothesized that these models might well describe how participants learn to trust from 
information on the other’s honesty. 
In the second part of this dissertation, I address the question of whether the formation 
of trustworthiness impressions rely on dopaminergic functioning with the help of a 
pharmacological intervention in combination with an fMRI study. Using different measures of 
resting-state functional connectivity, I demonstrate how pramipexole, a D2/D3 dopamine 
agonist targeting well-known dopaminergic brain structures (Ishibashi, Ishii, Oda, Mizusawa, 
& Ishiwata, 2011; Riba, Kramer, Heldmann, Richter, & Munte, 2008), impacts neural activity 
of specific brain structures at rest (Chapter 8). With the help of this pharmacological 
manipulation, the question as to whether pramipexole modulates impression-based trust in 
unknown others is addressed (Chapter 9). 
The objective of these studies is to examine the engagement of the dopaminergic system 
in trusting behaviors. Given previous evidence that pramipexole targets a specific subset of 
brain dopamine regions in subcortical and sensorimotor structures (Ishibashi et al., 2011; Riba 
et al., 2008; Ye, Hammer, & Munte, 2017), I hypothesized that pramipexole administration 
impacts resting-state brain dynamics of specific functional connectivity networks such as the 
cinguloopercular (involving subcortical brain regions) and sensorimotor (involving motor and 
sensorimotor brain regions) networks. Having the same participants play a subsequent one-shot 
TG after pramipexole administration, I describe how pramipexole affects trusting behaviors 
based on subjective trustworthiness impressions from faces. By maximally varying facial 
trustworthiness and minimizing variations in facial attractiveness, I hypothesized that 
pramipexole administration impacts trusting behavior independently of the modulation of 
subjective impressions about others’ facial trustworthiness. 
  




3.1.1 Experimental samples 
A total of 150 participants were collected for the studies in this dissertation. Study 1 and Study 
2 were run in the laboratory on a computer with procedures that would make them suitable for 
fMRI investigations. Study 3 employed one of these lab paradigms in an fMRI experiment, 
which, in combination with multivariate decoding analyses, predictive analytics and functional 
connectivity analysis, examined the neural underpinnings of honesty-based trustworthiness 
impressions. Finally, a last version of this paradigm was conducted in a behavioral experiment 
(Study 4), where the computational dynamics of social character learning were examined using 
reinforcement learning computational models. 
Study 5-6 of this dissertation investigated the effects of a dopamine agonist on neural 
dynamics and impression-based trust. Combining resting-state functional connectivity with 
multivariate classification and prediction analyses, Study 5 examines the effects of pramipexole 
on resting-state neural dynamics and the relationships between this neural modulation and 
pramipexole’s effects on attractiveness evaluations. Using a one-shot TG, Study 6 addressed 
the question as to whether trust in unknown others based on subjective trustworthiness 
impressions from faces can be modulated by pramipexole administration. 
 
3.1.2 Study 1-4 
Twenty-eight participants (18 females; 21.43±3.47, mean age±SD) were invited to the lab for 
Study 1. G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was used to calculate the 
desired sample size, based on the effects of others’ moral character on trustworthiness 
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perceptions in a previous study (Delgado et al., 2005). Twenty-eight participants (18 females; 
24.54±4.0, mean age±SD) were invited in Study 2 based on the effect size of Study 1. In Study 
3, data from 31 participants were acquired (20 females; 24.29±3.81, mean age±SD). This fMRI 
study was conducted at the Free University Berlin. In Study 4, a sample size similar to the 
previous behavioral studies was aimed at, ending up with a final sample of 33 participants (23 
females; 22.27±3.13, mean age±SD). 
For all three studies, exclusion criteria were: 1) present or past neurological and 
psychiatric disorders; 2) current physical or mental stress and other severe health complications; 
and 3) pharmacological medication up to 2 weeks prior to the study. All participants had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision. Further, all participants of the fMRI study were right-handed. 
Studies were approved by the local Ethics Committee of the University of Lübeck and 
conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants provided written 
informed consent and were monetarily compensated for their participation. 
 
3.1.3 Study 5-6 
Study 5 and 6 were conducted within the same pharmacological intervention. From the initial 
sample of 30 participants, 3 participants in Study 5 and 2 participants in Study 6 had to be 
excluded due to technical problems in data collection, leaving a final sample of 27 healthy, 
right-handed, female participants in Study 5 (22±2.26, mean age±SD) and 28 healthy, right-
handed, female participants in Study 6 (22.11±2.25, mean age±SD). Sample size was based 
on a previous study using similar procedures (Riba et al., 2008). The same exclusion criteria of 
Study 1-4 were used. Given sex differences in receptor availability (Pohjalainen, Rinne, 
Nagren, Syvalahti, & Hietala, 1998), modulation by pharmacological intervention (Munro et 
al., 2006; Soutschek et al., 2017), dopamine function (Castner, Xiao, & Becker, 1993) and 
resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) organization (Weis, Hodgetts, & Hausmann, 
2017), only female participants were recruited for this pharmacological intervention study. Data 
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on the use of hormonal contraception were collected, as the estrous cycle has been shown to 
affect the dopaminergic system (Becker, Perry, & Westenbroek, 2012; Jacobs & D'Esposito, 
2011) and hormonal contraceptive use can affect social behaviors as well (Alvergne & 
Lummaa, 2010; Birnbaum, Zholtack, Mizrahi, & Ein-Dor, 2019). 
 
3.1.4 Tasks: The Take Advice Game 
In Study 1-4, different versions of the same task were employed with very similar procedures. 
Participants were invited to the lab and were made to believe that they were going to play two 
games with other participants who were in different rooms. The games were the take advice 
game (TAG; Fig. 2A-B) and the TG. In Study 1, 2 and 4, participants performed the tasks on 
the lab computer. In Study 3, participants played the TAG in the MRI scanner and the TG 
afterwards. 
In the TAG, participants were required to choose the higher of two cards to win money. 
Importantly, they had no information about the numbers on the cards and needed to completely 
rely on the advisers who could see one of the cards and pass this information to the participants. 
Each trial consisted of four phases. Participants were made to believe that they randomly 
received the role of the advisee and were first matched with an adviser (adviser phase). The 
adviser gave an advice (advice phase). The advice could be any number between 1 and 9 except 
for 5. Finally, participants chose a card (decision phase) and received feedback (feedback 
phase), i.e., the actual numbers on the cards and a green/red circle to signal winnings/losses. 
To disentangle honesty from reward information, accurate advice was unpredictive of 
the winning card. Moreover, as advisers could see only one of the two cards and thus did not 
know which of the them was the winning card, their advice was not directly related to the 
participants’ winnings/losses. Finally, the accuracy of the advisers’ advice was manipulated to 
induce different honesty impressions in the participants. In Study 1, there were three types of 
advisers: 1) consistently honest advisers who always gave accurate advice; 2) consistently 
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dishonest advisers who always gave inaccurate advice; and 3) inconsistently honest advisers 
who were equally probable to give accurate and inaccurate advice. In Study 2, inconsistently 
honest advisers were replaced by no-reputation advisers. Participants received no feedback 
information about these advisers and hence could not form beliefs about their honest reputation. 
In Study 3, there were only two types of advisers, namely, consistently honest and consistently 
dishonest advisers. Finally, in Study 4, participants played with two advisers (an honest and a 
dishonest one) whose honesty was probabilistically determined (75-25%) and changed over the 
course of the game. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Paradigms. Schematic representation of the Take Advice Game (TAG). Advisers were given 
information about one of the two cards and could communicate this information to the advisee. Participants, in 
the role of advisee, made a decision based on the information received (decision phase). In the feedback phase, 
advisees received two types of information: 1) social information, i.e., the actual numbers on the cards, which 
informed them about whether the adviser had been honest (A.) or dishonest (B.); and 2) non-social information, 
i.e., a green or red circle, which informed them whether they won or lost, respectively. After the TAG, 
participants in the role of investor played a one-shot trust game (TG) with both honest (C.) and dishonest (D.) 
advisers now in the role of trustee. Investors received a monetary endowment and decided whether they wanted 
to entrust some of this amount with the trustees. Investors were told that the shared amount was tripled by the 
experimenter and passed on to the trustee, who could decide to share back any portion of the tripled amount. 
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3.1.5  Tasks: The Trust Game 
In Study 1-4, after the TAG and in Study 6 after the MRI session, participants played a one-
shot version of the TG as investor (Fig. 2C-D). In the TG, participants shared an initial 
endowment (trust), namely, 10 monetary units (MUs) with their trustees (in Study 1-4, their 
previous advisers now in the role of trustee). Any shared amount was tripled and sent to the 
trustee who could decide to share back (reciprocity) any portion of the received amount of 
money. Payoffs in MUs were converted in Euros at the end of the experiment. In Study 6, 
participants were presented with pictures of trustees whose facial trustworthiness was 
manipulated. 
 
3.1.6 Ratings and open questions 
In Study 1-4 and 6, participants rated the trustworthiness of the trustees on a 7-point Likert-
scale. Moreover, attractiveness ratings were also provided in Study 2, 4, 5 and 6. Attractiveness 
and trustworthiness ratings were randomized across participants. At the end of the experiments 
of Study 1-4, participants were asked to report (with a binary response option: Yes/No) whether 
they had used a strategy in the TAG, whether they thought that their strategy was successful 
and in Study 3, which criteria they used for their decisions in the TAG. 
 
3.1.7  Tasks: Facial Evaluations 
In Study 5, participants were invited to the lab at two different time points and received either 
0.5 mg pramipexole or a placebo. Two hours after drug administration, participants underwent 
an 8-minute resting-state scan. After the MRI session, they performed a facial evaluation task. 
Stimulus material was based on Aharon et al. (2001) and consisted of two sets of 40 facial 
stimuli, i.e., “attractive” (20 pictures, 10 female) and “unattractive” (20 pictures, 10 female) 
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faces. Participants made either a trustworthiness or an attractiveness evaluation of the face on 
a 7-point Likert-scale. 
 
3.2 Data analyses 
 
3.2.1  Behavioral data analyses 
In Study 1-4, differences in advice-taking behaviors in the TAG, investment behavior in the TG 
and trustworthiness ratings were assessed by computing a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) and post-hoc paired t-tests. Mixed-effects logistic regression analyses were 
employed to investigate variables explaining trial-by-trial advice-taking behavior in the TAG. 
To compare trust in advisers with different degrees of honesty between Study 1 and Study 2, a 
two-sample t-test was used. Correlation analyses were computed for relationships between 
ratings and behaviors in the TAG and TG. In Study 3, mixed-effects regressions were 
implemented to test time effects on trust in the advisers. 
In Study 5, effects of drug administration were tested with a paired sample t-test. In 
Study 6, mixed-effects regression models were employed to test the effects of drug 
administration on trustworthiness impressions and trusting behaviors. The best model was 
selected through a model comparison procedure using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
In each mixed-effects regression model, random-effects structure was kept maximal (Barr, 
Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). In Study 6, linear regression analyses were performed to 
investigate the contribution of trustworthiness and attractiveness impressions to trusting 
behavior in the TG. 
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3.2.2  Computational analyses in Study 4 
To mathematically formalize individual learning of others’ honest reputation in Study 4, 
computational models were fitted to participant’s behavior. The winning model was the 
following: 
 ((#) = (#45 + 7(8# − (#45)8# + 9(8# − (#45)(1 − 8#)   (3) 
7 = ;7<=>?-#																	if	advice	from	honest	adviser					7NO-<=>?-#										if	advice	from	dishonest	adviser 9 = ;9<=>?-#																if	advice	from	honest	adviser					9NO-<=>?-#										if	advice	from	dishonest	adviser 8# = P1							if	accurate	information				0							if	inaccurate	information	, 
 
where Vt is the subjective value of trusting the adviser on trial t, It is the type of social 
information (accurate or inaccurate advice) received on trial t, τ is the honesty learning 
parameter and δ is the dishonesty learning parameter. Trial-by-trial subjective values were 
transformed into trust probabilities with a stochastic decision rule (i.e., softmax function): 
 S#TU-# = 55V?WX(YZ[\]ZWY^_]Z[\]Z) ,    (4) 
 
where ptrust is the probability of choosing to trust, β is the participant-specific inverse 
temperature (a free parameter indicative of the stochasticity of participants’ choices), and Vtrust 
and Vdistrust represent the value of choosing to trust (i.e., take the advice) and to distrust (i.e., 
discount the advice), respectively. 
 
 40  
3.2.3  Neuroimaging data analyses in Study 3 and 5 
Data collection and preprocessing. In Study 3, data were collected with a Siemens 
MAGNETOM TRIO 3 Tesla scanner at the Freie Universität Berlin. For each participant, an 
average of 360 contiguous volumes per run were collected with a T2*-weighted echo-planar 
imaging (EPI) sequence. A total of 5 runs of functional data were collected. High-resolution 
structural images were acquired through a 3D sagittal T1-weighted magnetization-prepared 
rapid acquisition with gradient-echo (MP-RAGE) sequence. In Study 5, imaging data were 
acquired with a 3-Tesla Siemens MAGNETOM Skyra whole-body MRI-scanner at the Center 
of Brain, Behavior and Metabolism in Lübeck. Each resting-state scan was approximately 8-
minute long and consisted of 240 contiguous volumes. High-resolution structural images were 
acquired with a 3D sagittal T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence. 
Neuroimaging data analyses were performed on SPM12 v6685 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm12/). Preprocessing steps for functional images 
were as follows: 1) slice-timing correction; 2) unwarp for voxel displacement correction based 
on field maps; 3) realignment for head movement correction to the mean image; 4) co-
registration to the structural image using the unified segmentation procedure (Ashburner & 
Friston, 2005) and normalization into MNI space using deformation fields from the 
segmentation procedure and a resampling voxel size of 2×2×2 mm3. Multivariate analyses were 
based on these normalized functional images. For univariate analyses, functional images were 
also spatially smoothed using a Gaussian filter (8×8×8 mm3 full width at half maximum, 
FWHM) to decrease spatial noise. Movement outliers were identified and excluded if head 
movements/translations were above 3 mm/rad. 
 
Neuroimaging Analyses. Univariate and multivariate analyses were employed to analyzed 
fMRI data of Study 3 and 5. General linear models (GLMs) were defined for both univariate 
and multivariate analyses of fMRI data to estimate voxel-wise beta parameters that capture 
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neural signals related to each effect of interest. Motion parameters were further included as 
regressors of no-interest in all GLMs. A temporal high-pass filter with a cutoff of 128 seconds 
was applied for all GLMs. In Study 5, further regressors were introduced to control for white 
matter and cerebrospinal fluid signal, and a band-pass filter (0.01~0.1 Hz) to remove high-
frequency noise and linear drift artifacts. Results were whole-brain corrected for multiple 
comparisons using a voxel-level threshold of p < .001 and a cluster-level, family-wise error 
(FWEc) corrected threshold of p < .05 (Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson, 2016). Functional 
connectivity results in Study 5 were corrected on the ROI-level using a false discovery rate 
(FDR) of FDR < .05. In particular, RSFC was estimated for every participant and each session 
(dopamine/placebo) running Pearson’s bivariate correlations between the average blood-
oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signals of 142 ROIs as defined by Dosenbach et al. (2010) on 
the Functional Connectivity toolbox v15 (https://www.nitrc.org/projects/conn). Resting-state 
functional networks were defined based on the functional atlas of Dosenbach and colleagues 
(Dosenbach et al., 2007; Dosenbach et al., 2010; Dosenbach et al., 2006). 
Task-dependent functional connectivity was implemented in Study 3 using a whole-
brain psychophysiological interaction analysis (PPI, Friston et al., 1997). The PPI-GLM 
consisted of a task regressor, a physiological regressor entailing deconvolved BOLD signal 
from the seed region and a regressor for the interaction term with movement parameters as 
regressors of no interest. 
In Study 3, decoding analyses were performed using linear support vector machine 
(SVM) and a whole-brain searchlight (radius = 10 mm). Applying a leave-one-run-out cross-
validation (LOROCV), the SVM was trained on all but one run and tested on the left-out run. 
For searchlight decoding, only voxels within the whole-brain gray matter probability mask 
provided by SPM were used (white matter probability threshold = 0.1). 
Across-subject classification analyses in Study 3 were performed using a leave-one-
subject-out cross-validation (LOSOCV) approach in which the SVM was trained on average 
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beta images of all but one participant and tested on the left-out participant. Performance of the 
across-subject classification accuracy was computed running a permutation test with 10,000 
permutations (n_perm) and the sum of the models trained on permuted labels that performed 
better than the true model was computed (p_models). The nonparametric p value was assessed 
based on the following formula (Phipson & Smyth, 2010): 
 5	V	`_b=N?c-5	V	>_`?Tb 	.     (5) 
 
A similar LOSOCV procedure was employed for prediction analyses with multivariate 
regression models in Study 3 and Study 5. However, performance of the multivariate regression 
models was determined by computing the standardized mean squared error (smse). 
Finally, decoding results in Study 3 were functionally characterized by running a meta-
analytic image decoding analysis with the help of the Neurosynth Image Decoder 
(neurosynth.org; Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011). 
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Chapter 4 
4.1  Honesty as antecedent of trust 
In many circumstances in life, individuals seek advice before making a decision. As bad 
decisions might jeopardize an individual’s survival chances, gathering sufficient information 
from others helps make more informative decisions. It is thus pivotal to seek advice when 
making a decision, but it is also central to know whom advice should be sought from. However, 
little is known about how an adviser’s reputation impacts an individual’s willingness to trust 
advice. In particular, the honesty of the adviser might be central to one’s trustworthiness 
perceptions and thus function as antecedent of trust. 
As outlined in the introduction, a potential information-reward confound in the current 
literature employing advice-taking paradigms, that is, the fact that informative advice has in 
general been operationalized as the best option leading to higher or the highest reward 
outcomes, might have evoked cognitive processes closely associated with reward processing 
but unrelated to trust. Further, advisers have in general gained benefits for their advice and had 
incentives to send accurate advice in previous paradigms (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). This made 
participants in the role of the advisee focus more on the accuracy and congruency of the 
advisers’ advice to track the adviser’s motives rather than on learning the advisers’ character 
traits (Behrens et al., 2008; A. O. Diaconescu et al., 2014). However, in real-life situations, 
informative advice is not always advice about the best action or decision to make (Dalal & 
Bonaccio, 2010). For instance, in many circumstances, the advice of not doing something might 
be more informative than an advice of carrying out a specific array of actions. Similarly, 
advisers not always receive proximal benefits for their advice. The TAG was developed to 
address these issues. 
Study 1 shows that the TAG was successful in inducing honesty-based trustworthiness 
perceptions (Fig. 3A). Honest advice increased trustworthiness perceptions and trusting 
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behaviors across contexts. Participants not only took more advice from honest advisers but 
entrusted them also with more money in a subsequent interaction (i.e., in the TG). Notably, 
inconsistency in honest behavior reduced willingness to take advice, but inconsistent honest 
others were still trusted more and perceived as more trustworthy than dishonest advisers (Fig. 
3C). These results suggest that even small signs of honest behavior induce others to reciprocate. 
Finally, participants preferred honest advice even though it was not more informative to make 
better decisions. This finding suggests that honest advice is associated with an information 
bonus that is integrated into the decision-making process by uninformed decision-makers. It is 
still unclear, however, whether individuals would take the advice of an honest other even if 
information about the current honesty of the other is not available, or whether they would be 
more likely to take advice from those with an established reputation than from those whose 
reputation is unknown. 
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Chapter 5 
5.1  Honest reputation biases trustworthiness perceptions 
We often reach out to others for advice for the most disparate reasons. However, we rarely (if 
ever) have any control over the quality of the other’s advice. Employing a new version of the 
TAG, Study 2 investigated how individuals integrate information from others when feedback 
about the accuracy of the other’s advice is missing. Moreover, it was also inquired whether in 
such contexts, individuals would prefer to take advice from advisers with an established good 
reputation as opposed to advisers without any reputation. 
Findings from Study 2 suggest that when it is impossible to check the accuracy of the 
other’s advice, individuals decide whether to take the advice exclusively on the basis of the 
adviser’s reputation (Fig. 3B). These results extend previous work by demonstrating that 
uninformed decision-makers base their advice-taking and advice-discounting strategies on the 
other’s character or reputation (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Individuals were less likely to take 
advice from dishonest advisers than honest advisers or advisers without reputation but as likely 
to take advice from honest advisers as from advisers without reputation (Fig. 3D). Participants 
also preferred to take advice from advisers without an honest reputation than from advisers who 
showed to be inconsistent in their honesty (Fig. 3E). Moreover, participants also trusted 
advisers without reputation significantly more than dishonest advisers in a subsequent trusting 
interaction. These findings suggest that individuals had positive initial expectations of others 
and chose to take advice from them as a default trusting strategy. A decision to disregard an 
adviser’s advice was made only after participants learnt the other’s dishonest behavior, namely, 
when they realized that their trust had been misplaced. These behavioral patterns raise the 
question as to how individuals dynamically update and revise their beliefs about the other’s 
honest character. I will address this question later on in Chapter 7. 
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Thus, in these first two behavioral studies, I showed how individuals form beliefs about 
others’ reputation and how these beliefs inform behaviors across contexts. Results reveal that 
an honest reputation predicts trusting behavior across contexts and even in the absence of 
feedback about the other’s behavior. In particular, consistently and inconsistently honest others 
were trusted more and perceived as more trustworthy than dishonest ones. However, those 
whose honest reputation was unknown were trusted more than inconsistently honest others, 




Fig. 3. Behavioral results of Study 1-3. Advice-taking behavior in the Take Advice Game toward honest and 
dishonest advisers over time (i.e., blocks) in Study 1 (A.) and Study 2 (B.). In Study 2, participants did not 
receive any feedback after the first block (dashed line). Average advice-taking behavior toward honest, 
dishonest, inconsistent and no-reputation advisers in Study 1 (C.) and 2 (D.) for each participant. Between-
subject difference in advice-taking behavior toward inconsistently honest advisers in Study 1 and advisers 
without reputation in Study 2 (E.). Replication of the behavioral results from Study 1 in the MRI scanner (Study 
3): advice-taking behavior over functional MRI runs (F.) and average advice-taking behavior for each 
participant (G.). Dots in the boxplots represent participants. * p < .05. 
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Honest and dishonest others are thus quickly identified, and a reputational tag is attached 
to them that might ease the decision-making processes in future encounters. In difficult 
situations, in which we are required to make a decision, relying on others might reduce the 
burden of the decision-making process. Thus, trust might buffer the stress related to a difficult 
decision in our everyday life (Kikusui, Winslow, & Mori, 2006; Rapoza et al., 2016; 
Thorsteinsson, James, & Gregg, 1998; Yanagisawa et al., 2011). Conversely, interacting with 
dishonest others might be more stressful, as dishonest others do not appear to have an intrinsic 
motivation to commit to the other’s well-being. As such, they might exploit us or simply let us 
down at any time by providing false or poor information. A decision-maker who has observed 
signs of dishonesty might prefer to refrain from interacting with those unreliable others. 
However, when this cannot be avoided, a decision-maker might be in a state of high alertness 
and might constantly track the other’s actions to anticipate disadvantageous outcomes. This 
leads to specific hypotheses on the neural correlates of beliefs about honest character traits and 
on how these beliefs are dynamically updated and revised––research questions that will be 
addressed in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 6 
6.1  Neural representations of honesty predict future trust 
Neuroimaging studies investigating trust have largely employed the TG. However, as 
mentioned in the introduction, the structure of the game induces individuals to trust as long as 
they will be better off with trusting than distrusting (E. Fehr, 2009), thereby focusing on 
maximizing their personal payoffs (Ernst Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002). Thus, when there are 
no external incentives or when trust is associated with monetary losses (Johnson & Mislin, 
2011; Rode, 2010), individuals cease to trust (Chang et al., 2010; Hula, Vilares, Dayan, & 
Montague, 2017). This raises the question as to whether neural activity in striatal and 
orbitofrontal regions observed during a trust decision in the TG underlies the act of trust as such 
or rather represents reinforcement learning mechanisms signaling reward outcomes (Bellucci 
et al., 2017; Bellucci et al., 2018; Chang et al., 2011; Delgado et al., 2005). 
Indeed, other neuroimaging studies investigating social behaviors have observed a 
different set of brain regions when individuals interact with others, understand their intentions 
and learn their character, such as the DLPFC, the pTPJ, and the VMPFC, respectively 
(Buckholtz et al., 2008; Cooper et al., 2010; FeldmanHall et al., 2018; Igelstrom & Graziano, 
2017; Igelström, Webb, & Graziano, 2015; Koster-Hale et al., 2017; Saxe & Powell, 2006; 
Tusche et al., 2016; L. Young & Saxe, 2008). Thus, it is plausible to hypothesize that similar 
brain regions are engaged when individuals evaluate each other’s character to decide whether 
to trust. 
In Study 3, using multivariate voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) in combination with 
fMRI, the relationships between honesty, dishonesty and trust on both behavioral and neural 
level were analyzed. On the behavioral level, the findings observed in the previous 
behavioral studies (Chapter 4 and 5) were replicated (Fig. 3F-G). Honest behavior increases 
trust irrespective of proximal benefits associated with the act of trust. Further, the honest 
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character of an advisor makes others more likely to accept the adviser’s advice and more willing 
to trust the adviser in a later interaction (i.e., the TG). 
 On the neural level, the other’s honest character was decoded in brain regions 
associated with higher-order cognition, such as the DLPFC, posterior cingulate cortex 
(PCC) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS), whereas striatum and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
significantly decoded individual feedback information about one’s winnings and losses 
(Fig. 4A). Interestingly, honesty-decoding neural patterns in the DLPFC, PCC and IPS (but 
not reward-decoding neural patterns in the striatum and ACC) predicted individual trust in 
the TG. In particular, honesty more strongly recruited the VMPFC than dishonesty (Fig. 
4B). The VMPFC was in addition functionally coupled with the pTPJ during honesty as 
opposed to dishonesty (Fig. 4C). Further, stronger VMPFC-pTPJ coupling correlated with 
higher trust in the TG (Fig. 4D), suggesting that a stronger integration of the honesty signal 
increases an individual’s willingness to trust the other later on. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Neuroimaging results of Study 3. Multivariate analyses revealed that honesty-based trustworthiness 
was decoded in the PCC, bilateral DLPFC and left IPS (A.). Honesty, as opposed to dishonesty, engaged the 
VMPFC (B.). A PPI analysis revealed that the VMPFC was more strongly functionally coupled to the pTPJ for 
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honest than dishonest advisers (C.). VMPFC-pTPJ functional connectivity correlated with subsequent trust 
decisions for honest and dishonest advisers (D.). IPS, intraparietal sulcus; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; VMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; pTPJ, posterior 
temporoparietal junction; TG, trust game; PPI, psychophysiological interaction; a.u. arbitrary units; T, t-values; 
results of multivariate analyses are cluster-level family-wise error corrected (cFWE) for multiple comparisons 
at cFWE < .05 with an uncorrected, cluster-forming threshold of p < .001; results of functional connectivity 
analyses are small-volume, cluster-level family-wise error corrected within the pTPJ (FWEsvc) at FWEsvc < .05 
with an uncorrected, cluster-forming threshold of p < .001. 
 
Finally, an asymmetry in the OFC activity in response to positive feedback due to the 
honest reputation of the adviser was also observed. Such asymmetry in feedback encoding 
likely jeopardizes an individual’s ability to optimally update one’s beliefs about the other, 
promoting judgmental biases. It still remains unclear, however, whether the other’s honest 
character impairs learning processes underlying character trait learning. For instance, how do 
individuals learn the honest character of the other to be able to optimally revise their behavior 
and avoid being exploited by the other? Better insights into these learning processes might 
clarify whether and how honest reputation impairs social learning––an empirical question that 
will be addressed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 7 
7.1  Honest reputation impairs learning 
In the previous experiments, I have shown how honesty induces trustworthiness perceptions 
that inform trust decisions across contexts. Individuals initially trusted unknown others, and 
this level of trust was similar to their level of trust in advisers with a good reputation. On the 
contrary, individuals adapted their trusting behavior as they slowly gathered evidence that their 
trust was misplaced. A set of frontoparietal and mentalizing brain regions was engaged, which 
likely allowed for this behavioral adaptation. These results indicate that in social interactions 
with unknown others, people tend to trust first if they do not have evidence to behave otherwise 
or as long as they do not learn that trust might make them vulnerable to others’ exploitation. 
However, evidence on how information about the other’s trustworthiness character is integrated 
to inform and, eventually, revise these trusting behaviors is still missing. 
In this chapter, a new version of the TAG is described that allowed to apply 
reinforcement-learning models to mathematically formalize how social information is 
processed and integrated to form and update beliefs about the other’s honest reputation. Results 
from this experiment replicated and extended the behavioral patterns observed in previous 
chapters. First, participants were seen to initially trust both advisers. However, after a couple 
of trials, when they realized that their trust in the dishonest adviser was misplaced, they 
immediately adapted their behavior, discounting advice from the dishonest partner. However, 
and most interestingly, the results further showed that the same did not happen for those who 
could establish a reputation as an honest partner over the course of the first period of the 
interaction (Fig. 5A). In other words, participants kept trusting the advice of those advisers who 
initially showed to be honest, disregarding information inconsistent with their honest 
reputation. This suggests that individuals integrate information from those with an honest 
reputation differently from those with a dishonest reputation over the course of the social 
 52  
interaction. That is, once the initial positive expectations that the adviser is trustworthy were 
confirmed, individuals placed more weight on new incoming information consistent with the 
honest reputation of the adviser. On the contrary, when the initial positive expectations that the 
adviser behaves in a trustworthy manner were not confirmed, individuals tended to value new 
consistent and inconsistent information equally. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Behavioral and learning results of Study 4. Advice-taking behavior toward initially honest and 
dishonest advisers over time (i.e., blocks) in Study 4 (A.). Dashed lines separate blocks. Advisers changed their 
honesty in advice giving across blocks. Participants closely tracked changes in honesty of the initially dishonest 
advisers, but not of the initially honest advisers. Such difference in behavioral adaptation points to a learning 
impairment related to a failure in successful belief update. Results from computational modeling reveal that 
participants weighted accurate information from the initially honest adviser significantly more than inaccurate 
information or accurate information from the initially dishonest adviser (B.). 7 , learning rate for accurate 
information; 9, learning rate for inaccurate information. * p < .05. 
 
Notably, the asymmetry in information weighting for honest advisers impaired beliefs 
updating and behavior change once honest advisers turned dishonest. On the contrary, 
individuals were still able to change their behavior toward initially dishonest advisers after 
learning that they become increasingly honest. This likely hinges on a significant difference in 
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the weights given to the information coming from the advisers (Fig. 5B). That is, accurate 
information from initially honest advisers was valued significantly more than the same 
information provided by an initially dishonest adviser. Importantly, initial beliefs formed from 
direct reputation (being honest or dishonest) were so enduring that participants trusted the 
advisers significantly differently in a subsequent interaction (i.e., in the TG), although they 
behaved on average equally honestly. 
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Chapter 8 
8.1  Neural modulation of resting-state brain dynamics 
Results from the previous chapters, provide novel evidence that representations of character 
traits informative of social behaviors are encoded in a distributed neural network associated 
with higher-order cognition and are separable from a reward encoding network. However, these 
studies still leave unanswered the question as to what role the dopaminergic system plays in 
trusting behaviors. 
In Study 5 and 6, a pharmacological intervention was conducted to investigate the 
relationships between dopamine and trust. In the current chapter, the effects of the 
pharmacological manipulation on neural dynamics is described. A D2/D3 dopamine agonist 
(i.e., pramipexole) was administrated to participants in a double-blind, placebo-controlled, 
within-subject design. The drug was administrated before participants underwent a resting-state 
MRI scan. Resting-state brain dynamics reflected the neural responsiveness to acute drug 
administration (Fig. 6A). In particular, subcortical brain regions within the cinguloopercular 
network were mostly affected by the dopaminergic manipulation. The most affected resting-
state brain dynamics were in well-known dopaminergic brain areas such as the striatum and 
medial PFC previously shown to be modulated by pramipexole (Gurevich & Joyce, 1999; Hall 
et al., 1996; Ishibashi et al., 2011; A. M. Murray, Ryoo, Gurevich, & Joyce, 1994; Riba et al., 
2008). Notably, these neural signatures of pramipexole’s administration significantly predicted 
the drug’s effects on subsequent facial attractiveness evaluations (Fig. 6B-C). In particular, 
stronger functional connectivity within the cinguloopercular network predicted increased facial 
attractiveness evaluations following pramipexole intake. 
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Chapter 9 
9.1  Dopaminergic effects on behavioral trust 
After having shown that administration of a dopamine agonist successfully modulates neural 
dynamics, Study 6 addressed the question as to whether this dopaminergic modulation impacted 
trusting behavior. However, as pointed out in the introduction, eliciting trusting behaviors by 
inducing trustworthiness perceptions over the course of repeated interactions is problematic 
because learning mechanisms hinge on dopaminergic functioning, which might as well be 
impacted by a pharmacological intervention of the dopaminergic system. This, in turn, might 
introduce a serious confound that makes disentangling the effects of dopamine on trust from its 
effects on learning processes preceding trusting behavior impossible. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Neuroimaging and behavioral results of Study 5 and 6. In Study 5, resting-state network-level 
analyses revealed that only the SMN and the CON were significantly modulated by pramipexole intake (A.). 
Pramipexole intake significantly impacted participants’ perceptions of facial attractiveness (B.). The behavioral 
effects of pramipexole on attractiveness perceptions could be predicted by pramipexole’s modulation of resting-
state CON dynamics (C.). In Study 6, participants’ trusting behaviors were modulated by the facial 
trustworthiness but not the facial attractiveness of the trustee (D.). Pramipexole affected participants’ trust by 
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interacting with hormonal contraceptive use (E.). SMN, somatosensory motor network; CON, cinguloopercular 
network; smse, standardized mean squared error; TG, trust game. * p < .05. 
 
One possible solution is to induce trustworthiness perceptions of others without having 
participants learn of the others’ trustworthiness. Hence, in this Study 6, participants’ trust 
during the one-shot TG was manipulated by presentation of faces that varied in their facial 
trustworthiness. Further, to minimize facial attractiveness confounds, faces maximally differed 
on the trustworthiness dimension with minimal variations on the attractiveness dimension. The 
facial trustworthiness manipulation was successful, as participants trusted the trustworthy-
looking partners significantly more (Fig. 6D). Moreover, trusting behavior could significantly 
be explained by the trustee’s facial trustworthiness independently of facial attractiveness 
information. Furthermore, administration of pramipexole decreased trust in others. This drug 
effect was further mediated by hormonal contraceptive use, as women who did not use 
hormonal contraceptives trusted less after pramipexole intake, whereas pramipexole increased 
trust among contraceptive users (Fig. 6E). 
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Chapter 10: General Discussion 
In this dissertation, I pursued two lines of research that aimed at providing insights into the 
psychological antecedents and neural determinants of trusting behaviors. In the first part, I 
showed how individuals form beliefs about others’ reputation and how these beliefs inform 
trusting behaviors across contexts. Results showed that an honest reputation predicts trusting 
behavior across different social interactions even in the absence of current feedback about the 
other’s behavior. Honesty-based trustworthiness was encoded in an extended network 
involving the lateral PFC, IPS and PCC that predicted future trust. Stronger integration of an 
honesty signal from the VMPFC correlated with higher trust in a later interaction with the other. 
Notably, an honest reputation modulated how feedback information was encoded in the OFC. 
Further, participants had initial positive expectations of others’ trustworthiness, employing trust 
as a default behavioral strategy in interactions with new partners. Predictably however, signs 
of dishonesty negatively impacted trust. On the contrary, confirmation of these initial positive 
expectations produced strong trustworthiness perceptions about others that impaired social 
learning and hindered adaptive, flexible behavior. This learning impairment was due to an 
asymmetry in the weighting of information and its integration when interacting with honest 
others. This difference in information weights might in turn depend on the honesty-induced 
differences in feedback processing in the OFC observed in the fMRI study. 
In the second part, I provided novel pharmacological evidence of the role of dopamine 
in trust. This included delineating the effects of pramipexole (a D2/D3 dopamine agonist) on 
neural dynamics at rest. These analyses revealed that pramipexole administration successfully 
modulated different metrics of resting-state brain dynamics, in particular, in brain regions 
known to be targeted by pramipexole’s dopamine agonist effects. Once the modulation of the 
dopaminergic system was assured, the effects of pramipexole on behavioral trust in a one-shot 
TG were tested outside the MRI. Thereby, it was shown that the contribution of facial 
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trustworthiness to subjective impressions that guide subsequent trust decisions could be 
disentangled from other types of social information from faces (e.g., attractiveness). Although 
pramipexole did not impact subjective, trustworthiness impressions, trusting behavior was 
significantly modulated by the dopamine agonist. Notably, the effects of pramipexole on 
behavioral trust interacted with hormonal contraceptive use in the female sample. Increased 
trust was observed in women using hormonal contraceptives and decreased trust in naturally 
cycling women after pramipexole intake. 
 
10.1  Honesty as antecedent of trust 
To choose the proper course of actions in a dynamically changing world, decision-makers need 
to gather information about the structure of the world (R. C. Wilson, Geana, White, Ludvig, & 
Cohen, 2014). Even though a decision’s outcomes remain to a certain degree always uncertain, 
gathering more information allows one to make more reliable inferences about the future state 
of the world. More reliable inferences imply a more accurate model of the world, reduced 
surprise about future events and better survival chances (Badcock, Friston, & Ramstead, 2019). 
Human beings prefer to make decisions whose outcomes are known or can be known 
probabilistically (i.e., under risk), whereas they show a strong aversion to ambiguous situations 
in which no inference on future outcomes can be made (Platt & Huettel, 2008). 
In a social interaction, the world whose hidden states need to be inferred is another 
human being. In this context, a human agent tries to first gather information about the other that 
can be based on a previous experience with that person, i.e., direct reputation, or on indirect 
information about the other, i.e., indirect reputation (Izuma, 2012; Li, Meng, & Ma, 2017). 
With the help of this information, the decision-maker can make inferences on the other’s 
character to deduce the other’s behavior in different contexts. For instance, I may trust you if 
you have previously been trustworthy to me or if I have heard that you are a trustworthy person. 
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Previous research has suggested that individuals trust others because they have positive 
expectations about the good intentions and behaviors of others (Rousseau et al., 1998). As 
outlined in the introduction, models of trust have proposed qualities of the other that promote 
trustworthiness impressions, which ultimately guide trusting behaviors. However, empirical 
evidence of honesty as an antecedent of trust was still lacking. Only recently, some studies have 
pointed to honesty as a fundamental character trait that correlates with a variety of prosocial 
behaviors, such as altruistic behavior, unconditional kindness and reciprocity (Ashraf et al., 
2006; Baumert et al., 2014; Hilbig et al., 2015; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2015). 
Study 1 provides evidence of honesty as antecedent of trust. Results showed that 
individuals prefer taking advice when there are no reasons to believe the other to be 
untrustworthy or dishonest. These findings concur with evidence showing that individuals 
prefer options that are either preferred or suggested by others (Biele et al., 2009; Mahmoodi et 
al., 2018). When, however, participants learnt over the course of the interaction that some 
partners are honest and others are not, participants revised their behavior by discounting the 
advice of the dishonest partners. As participants could not know at the time of the decision 
whether the advice was accurate or not, participants based their decisions on the reputation of 
the other. Honest others built their reputation on the accurate information they shared and their 
honest reputation might have worked as a proxy for the quality of the information shared in a 
future encounter (Gordon & Spears, 2012). Participants’ preference for advice from honest 
others may thus reflect their attempt to improve their decisions and reduce uncertainty by using 
information that is likely accurate. This finding accords with previous results showing that 
individuals more strongly rely on others’ advice in highly uncertain situations like the TAG 
(McElreath et al., 2005; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; Sniezek, May, & Sawyer, 1990; Van Swol 
& Sniezek, 2005). 
Even though taking accurate advice from honest others did not yield higher gains, 
participants showed a consistent preference for truthful advice. Previous paradigms have not 
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properly controlled for the reward-information confound, as advice usually took the form of the 
best option in the task, generally associated with higher rewards (Behrens et al., 2008; Biele et 
al., 2009; A. O. Diaconescu et al., 2014; Rodriguez Buritica et al., 2019). Thus, patterns of 
advice-taking behaviors in previous studies might well be described by more parsimonious 
explanations, such as by classic mechanisms of reward learning. However, good, informative 
advice is rarely advice about the best and most rewarding decision to make. Examples are, for 
instance, disclosing information about certain decisions, sharing one’s own experience after 
certain choices or advice of not to take certain actions (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Dalal & 
Bonaccio, 2010). Results reported in this dissertation suggest that uninformed decision-makers 
prefer to take informative advice irrespective of their proximal benefits. Moreover, in a 
subsequent interaction, participants repaid their advisers for their honesty by entrusting more 
money to the honest advisers in the TG, whereas no relationships were found between the 
amount of gains derived by the honest advice in the TAG and money entrusted in the TG. These 
results confirm that in a social exchange, individuals are motivated by reputational concerns 
and decide whether to trust based on the social qualities of the other. Further, they validate the 
strength of the task in disentangling social learning processes from others, related but 
exogenous, learning processes (such as reward learning). This was of pivotal importance to 
Study 3 to capture the specific neural signatures of honest character learning (see below). 
 
10.2  Initial expectations are disrupted by dishonesty 
Even if a decision-maker lacks information about the interacting partner, individuals still have 
a way to make good-enough inferences about the other. In particular, individuals use their 
knowledge of social norms as priors to infer the other’s likely behavior (Bellucci et al., 2018; 
Bicchieri, 2014). In the TAG, at the beginning of a social interaction, participants might have 
assumed that the other complies with social norms of fairness and equity. Despite the betrayal 
aversion associated with acts of trust (J. A. Aimone & Houser, 2011, 2013; I. Bohnet et al., 
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2008; Iris Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004), these expectations of a compliant behavior help 
individuals overcome concerns of betrayal and exploitation by the partner (Thomas 
Baumgartner, Fischbacher, Feierabend, Lutz, & Fehr, 2009; Masuda & Nakamura, 2012; van 't 
Wout & Sanfey, 2008). In Study 2, this was supported by the fact that participants trusted 
advisers with an unknown reputation as much as advisers with an honest reputation. The same 
is proven by participants’ initial behavior toward dishonest advisers at the beginning of the 
social interactions in Study 1-4. In all experiments, participants revised their advice-taking 
behavior toward dishonest advisers only after they realized that their trust in those advisers was 
misplaced. 
Thus, when a history of interactions with the partner is possible, individuals integrate 
information that informs their beliefs about the other’s character. Thereby, they attach 
“reputation tags” to the other that can be thought of as priors allowing good-enough estimations 
of the other’s (future) behavior (E. Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). Based on the other’s reputation, 
individuals decide on the best trusting strategy (Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; 
Semmann et al., 2004; Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002). Therefore, people grant others a 
trustworthy character recognizing distrust as the optimal strategy in case of an untrustworthy 
reputation. Such reputation likely informs one’s future behavior during interactions with the 
recognized untrustworthy other. Consistently with this notion, Study 1-4 showed that an honest 
reputation in advice giving has an impact not only on advice-taking behaviors in the current 
situation, but also generalizes to trust in a different context and situation. 
Interestingly, signs of dishonesty negatively impacted one’s trustworthiness 
expectations of others. This was evidenced by the fact that participants trusted inconsistently 
honest advisers less than advisers without any reputation. Nonetheless, even small signs of 
honesty increased participants’ trust, which remained at higher levels for inconsistently honest 
advisers as opposed to dishonest advisers. These findings suggest that honesty plays a more 
central role in building and maintaining trust than simple behavioral predictability (e.g., being 
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predictably dishonest) (G. R. Jones & George, 1998). However, signs of dishonesty have 
deleterious consequences on initial expectations of others’ trustworthiness, as, once it is lost, 
trust might be difficult to regain and might never be entirely regained (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; 
Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). 
 
10.3  Neural signatures of honesty predict future trust 
Study 3 showed that the trustworthiness inferred from the other’s honest or dishonest behavior 
was decoded in four brain regions (i.e., the PCC, IPS and bilateral DLPFC). These neural 
signatures of honesty-based trustworthiness was able to successfully classify neural responses 
to honesty and dishonesty in out-of-sample individuals. Importantly, brain signals from these 
regions was informative of future trust decisions in a subsequent interaction with the partners. 
Thus, these brain regions might play a central role in understanding others, learning their 
character and revise one’s behavior to tailor it to the other’s behavior. 
This is consistent with previous work showing that these brain regions are associated 
with judgments about others’ traits (PCC) (Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014), 
attribution of temporary beliefs to others (IPS) (Igelstrom & Graziano, 2017; Schurz et al., 2014) 
and a variety of prosocial behaviors such as generous decisions (Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, 
Treyer, & Fehr, 2006) and group-based cooperation (DLPFC) (Lemmers-Jansen, Krabbendam, 
Veltman, & Fett, 2017; Wills, FeldmanHall, Collaboration, Meager, & Van Bavel, 2018). 
Importantly, the PCC, IPS and bilateral DLPFC have been observed to form an interconnected 
brain network during interpersonal interactions (Hackel et al., 2015; Igelström, Webb, Kelly, 
& Graziano, 2016; Mende-Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2013). Given that Study 3 showed that 
these regions are not only engaged during an online interaction but further contain neural signal 
informative of individual future trust, these regions likely build an intertwined brain network 
engaged in representations of behaviorally-relevant qualities of others, such as social character 
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traits. These representations likely entail information retrieved to choose the optimal behavioral 
strategy during present and future social interactions. 
Critically, these brain regions were also more strongly recruited by dishonesty than 
honesty. As participants revised their behavior toward dishonest partners over the course of the 
interaction but not toward honest others, these findings confirm the role of these regions in 
representing social character traits of others for optimal social strategy selection. This concords 
with previous evidence that these regions are engaged by others’ non-cooperative behavior 
(Yang, Zheng, Yang, Li, & L., 2018) and violations of expectations in social contexts (e.g., 
decisions to lie) (Chang, Yarkoni, Khaw, & Sanfey, 2013; Cloutier, Gabrieli, O’Young, & 
Ambady, 2011; Greene & Paxton, 2009). Hence, recruitment of these brain regions by 
dishonesty might reflect the online tracking of the other’s norm-deviant behavior and the 
updating of one’s beliefs for flexible behavioral adjustments. 
Honesty, on the other hand, recruited the VMPFC and brain signal in the VMPFC was 
functionally coupled with the pTPJ during honesty encoding. Notably, the strength of this 
functional connectivity correlated with higher trust in the partner during the future interaction 
in the TG. Given the role of the VMPFC in representations of positive traits of others (Hackel 
et al., 2015; R. J. Murray, Schaer, & Debbane, 2012; Welborn & Lieberman, 2015) and of the 
pTPJ in inferences on others’ intentions (Saxe & Powell, 2006; L. Young & Saxe, 2008), these 
findings suggest that a stronger integration of the honesty signal from the VMPFC supports 
inferences on the other’s good intentions undertaken by the pTPJ, resulting in more positive 
beliefs about the other. These positive beliefs, in turn, lead to an increased willingness to trust 
the other. Thus, the interplay between these two brain regions likely represents a neural 
mechanism underlying integration of character information for belief formation about the 
other’s behavior. 
Finally, honesty modulated neural responses to value information in the OFC during 
outcome evaluations. In particular, positive outcomes received when interacting with honest 
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partners elicited significantly higher responses in the OFC. In line with its role in processing 
subjective values (Sescousse, Redoute, & Dreher, 2010; Valentin, Dickinson, & O’Doherty, 
2007), higher neural activity in the OFC might reflect an enhanced subjective value of rewards 
induced by the honest character of the other. These findings indicate a possible mechanistic 
explanation to the positivity bias toward individuals with a good reputation that has been 
observed to influence learning processes (Corriveau & Harris, 2009; Sabbagh & Shafman, 
2009). An honesty-dependent asymmetry in valuation of outcomes in the OFC might promote 
stronger susceptibility to reputational priors and less flexibility in revising one’s beliefs about 
the other. This complies with previous work showing that decreased OFC activity is associated 
with stronger resistance to belief change during information encoding (Kaplan, Gimbel, & 
Harris, 2016). Such honesty-based asymmetry in information encoding might jeopardize an 
individual’s ability to optimally form and update one’s beliefs and so foster a broad array of 
judgmental biases. Study 1-3, however, still do not provide compelling evidence as to whether 
the other’s honest character impairs learning processes underlying character trait learning. 
Study 4 was conducted to answer this open question. 
 
10.4  Impact of honest reputation on social learning 
Results from Study 4 replicated and extended the findings in previous experiments. First, 
participants were seen to initially trust all advisers. However, when they realized that their trust 
in the dishonest adviser was misplaced, they adapted their behavior, discounting advice from 
the dishonest partner. Notably, this behavioral adjustment was not observed after the adviser 
could establish a reputation as an honest partner over the course of the first block. So, 
participants were seen to keep trusting the honest partner even after the partner stopped being 
honest. This suggests that participants were integrating information from the two advisers 
differently over the course of the social interaction. At the beginning of the social interaction, 
when no reputational knowledge about the others was yet available, all information was 
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integrated in a similar fashion. However, once the initial positive expectation that the partner 
would behave in a trustworthy fashion was confirmed, participants might have reduced the 
integration of new incoming information about the current reputation of the initially honest 
adviser. On the contrary, when the initial positive expectation that the partner would be 
trustworthy was violated, participants readily changed their behavior and more closely tracked 
the other’s trial-by-trial decisions, allowing for optimal behavioral revision over the course of 
the social exchange. 
These behavioral patterns, which appear to reveal a learning impairment for honest 
partners, are likely due to the honesty-dependent difference in information weighting. In 
particular, accurate and inaccurate information from the initially dishonest adviser were 
weighted in a similar fashion, which likely explains why participants could readily update their 
beliefs about the initially dishonest adviser in the second block of the task when the adviser 
became trustworthy. On the contrary, participants placed more weight on accurate than 
inaccurate information from the honest partner, which impaired the flexible revision of one’s 
advice-taking behavior. This might be due to the fact that information consistent with one’s 
initial positive expectations led to the formation of strong priors that are less likely to be subject 
to revision. Concomitantly, such strong beliefs might have made individuals more likely to 
discount evidence of behaviors inconsistent with the other’s reputation, like when individuals 
rationalize inconsistent policy contents on the basis of party membership (Cohen, 2003). 
These results might explain a wide array of perceptual and judgmental biases in different 
domains. For instance, recent work has indicated a perceptual bias that contributes to prejudicial 
judgments of young Black men, whereby young Black men are judged as bigger and more 
threatening than young White men (J. P. Wilson, Hugenberg, & Rule, 2017). As perceptual 
evidence is integrated following a reinforcement learning mechanism (Badcock et al., 2019), 
such perceptual bias might rely on asymmetric weights of perceptual information similar to the 
one observed in Study 4. Social phenomena like the “do-gooder derogation” or “self-licensing” 
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might be tracked back to a similar information-weighting asymmetry as well (Merritt, Effron, 
& Monin, 2010; Minson & Monin, 2011; Monin, Sawyer, & Marquez, 2008). For example, 
morally dubious actions might be licensed by past “good” deeds through reputation-based 
reinforcement mechanisms based on which we learn that others are likely to discount evidence 
inconsistent with our good reputation (Merritt et al., 2010). 
Overall, findings from these studies might reflect a learning strategy optimization in 
social interactions that explains the need of reputational priors. Identifying and being able to 
keep track of free-riders is of pivotal importance to the individual survival chances, as free-
riders may jeopardize one’s existence through perilous exploitation. However, tracking the 
intentions and motives of every single action of our social fellows implies enormous and 
unsustainable energy costs that call for better strategies to track and control the behaviors of 
others. Reputation might offer the tool that solves this conundrum allowing for efficient 
resource distribution in social behavior control. In particular, using reputational tags to quickly 
identify who deserves our trust enables one to track only a limited number of interactions in 
which the risk of exploitation is more likely to occur, resulting in an efficient energy saving. 
Although efficient in most situations, this strategy also lurks the danger of biased estimations 
that negatively influence the integration of new inconsistent information. This, in turn, might 
result in suboptimal decisions, for instance, as shown in Study 4, when individuals trust no-
longer trustworthy others. Future studies are needed to shed light on the neural mechanisms 
underlying this social learning impairment. 
 
10.5  Effects of a dopamine agonist on brain and behavior 
Study 5-6 implemented a pharmacological intervention to investigate the second line of this 
dissertation’s research, namely, the relationships between dopamine and trust. 
Study 5 first examined whether the pharmacological intervention was successful in 
modulating neural dynamics within well-known dopaminergic brain structures. Analyses of 
 67  
resting-state dynamics after drug administration show that brain regions in the striatum and 
medial PFC were modulated by pramipexole, concurring with previous evidence on D2/D3 
dopamine receptor availability in the human brain and pramipexole’s modulation of neural 
dynamics (Gurevich & Joyce, 1999; Hall et al., 1996; Ishibashi et al., 2011; A. M. Murray et 
al., 1994; Riba et al., 2008). In particular, pramipexole administration significantly increased 
functional connectivity strength within two resting-state networks (i.e., the cinguloopercular 
network and the somatosensory network), and regional BOLD signal variability in subcortical 
and prefrontal regions. Pramipexole particularly increased BOLD signal variability in the 
striatum, OFC and ACC. Although the functional role of BOLD signal variability and its 
relationship to behavior is yet to be clarified (Aguirre, Zarahn, & D'Esposito, 1998; T. B. Jones, 
Bandettini, & Birn, 2008; Miller et al., 2002; Neumann, Lohmann, Zysset, & von Cramon, 
2003; S. M. Smith et al., 2005), an increasing number of recent investigations points to a link 
between BOLD signal variability and cognitive abilities (Alavash et al., 2018; Garrett, 
Kovacevic, McIntosh, & Grady, 2013). 
Moreover, the selective effect of pramipexole on facial evaluations could be predicted 
by this modulation of resting-state dynamics. In particular, pramipexole increased impressions 
of facial attractiveness, in line with previous studies showing that facial attractiveness evokes 
activity in dopaminergic regions like the striatum and medial PFC (Aharon et al., 2001; J. 
O'Doherty et al., 2003; Pegors, Kable, Chatterjee, & Epstein, 2015; D. V. Smith, Clithero, 
Boltuck, & Huettel, 2014; Winston, O'Doherty, Kilner, Perrett, & Dolan, 2007). In addition, 
this increase in attractiveness impressions was predicted by the enhanced connectivity strength 
within the cinguloopercular network, suggesting a direct link between pramipexole’s 
modulation of resting-state dynamics and the drug’s effects on behavior. In particular, 
functional connectivity between the striatum and pTPJ was more strongly associated with 
higher attractiveness evaluations after pramipexole administration, suggesting that pramipexole 
might enhance the socially-relevant, reward-based information flow between a pivotal region 
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in reward processing (i.e., the striatum) and another pivotal region in mental states attribution 
(i.e., the pTPJ) (J. O'Doherty et al., 2004; Saxe & Powell, 2006; W. Schultz et al., 1997; L. 
Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010; L. Young & Saxe, 2008). 
An interesting research question for future studies relates to understanding whether 
fMRI neural dynamics can be used as biomarkers of the pharmacologically-induced 
neurochemical changes on the neural level. In particular, although widely used as dopamine 
agonist, it has been suggested that pramipexole might behave as a dopamine antagonist as well, 
especially when acting on D3 autoreceptors. In fact, D3 autoreceptor activity has been 
suggested to inhibit the reward-related phasic firing of dopaminergic neurons (Sokoloff et al., 
2006). Further, a previous fMRI study has observed reduced fMRI activations in brain 
structures rich in D3 autoreceptors after pramipexole intake (Riba et al., 2008), which might be 
linked to an inhibition of dopamine activity. It remains, thus, an open question whether 
changing dynamics in BOLD signal, and, in particular, functional connectivity might be 
informative of how drugs operate on receptors. BOLD signal reflects post-synaptic activity and 
both neurotransmitter agonists and antagonists modulate blood flow (Attwell et al., 2010; 
Norup Nielsen & Lauritzen, 2001; Zonta et al., 2003). As recent evidence shows that excitatory 
and inhibitory activity can be modeled from BOLD data (Havlicek, Ivanov, Roebroeck, & 
Uludag, 2017; Sotero & Trujillo-Barreto, 2007; Sten et al., 2017), variations in BOLD 
dynamics and functional connectivity might also reflect the impact of a pharmacological 
administration on neural activity. 
 
10.6  Reducing trust by dopamine-agonist administration 
After having shown that administration of a dopamine agonist successfully modulates neural 
dynamics, Study 6 was conducted to investigate whether pramipexole administration impacts 
behavioral trust. As mentioned, individuals may ground their trust decisions in subjective 
impressions about the partner’s trustworthiness that are formed rapidly and effortlessly 
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(Alexander Todorov et al., 2009) or may dynamically update their beliefs about the partner’s 
trustworthiness based on previous experience with the partner in repeated social interactions 
(Hula, Vilares, Lohrenz, Dayan, & Montague, 2018). However, on the one hand, the 
engagement of dopaminergic brain structures in repeated trusting interactions might be related 
to reward anticipation or reinforcement learning processes (Chang et al., 2010; van 't Wout & 
Sanfey, 2008). On the other, the effects of dopamine on impression-based trust might be 
confounded by different types of social information from faces other than facial trustworthiness, 
such as facial attractiveness (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; R. K. Wilson & Eckel, 2006). 
Thus, Study 6 employed a one-shot TG, where participants were presented with trustees’ 
faces that maximally varied along the trustworthiness dimension with minimal variations in 
facial attractiveness. Our results first replicated previous evidence that pharmacologically-
modulation of dopaminergic functioning does not alter trustworthiness perceptions of others 
despite successful neural modulation of the brain’s reward system (Zebrowitz et al., 2018). 
Collectively, findings from previous and current studies suggest that neural dynamics and brain 
regions other than dopaminergic areas likely underlie first subjective impressions of others’ 
social character. 
Moreover, we disentangled for the first time the contribution of trustworthiness 
information to trusting behavior from attractiveness evaluations. Indeed, by reducing the 
attractiveness information in faces, it was possible to single out the specific effects of facial 
trustworthiness. Future studies might consider conducting similar experiments by constructing 
the stimulus material as we did to investigate whether different types of social information from 
faces induce different trust motives in individuals. Trustworthy-looking individuals, for 
instance, are likely to be trusted because they signal to be good cooperators (Dunbar, 2004), 
while trust in attractive others might be driven by reward-based processes, for instance, because 
of a “beauty premium” associated with attractive individuals (Mobius & Rosenblat, 2006). 
 70  
Finally, pramipexole affected behavioral trust in the one-shot TG. However, effects of 
pramipexole on impression-based trust were modulated by hormonal contraceptive use in the 
female sample. In particular, women using hormonal contraceptives trusted more after 
pramipexole intake, whereas trust was reduced in non-users. Consistently with the absence of 
any dopaminergic effect on trustworthiness impressions, such effects on trust were observed 
across facial trustworthiness dimensions. 
The effects of pramipexole on impression-based trust might be due to pramipexole 
modulation of dopaminergic brain structures as a dopamine agonist or as dopamine antagonist. 
As dopamine agonist, pramipexole might reduce participants’ sensitivity to social contact and 
feedback by saturating the human need to belong, which would then result in reduced 
willingness to relate to and connect with others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). On the contrary, 
inhibition of dopamine activity might silence the ability to form and maintain satisfying social 
relationships, equally reducing an individual’s willingness to trust. 
Unexpectedly, the effects of pramipexole on trust in women using hormonal 
contraceptives were reversed as compared to non-users. Previous work has shown that 
hormonal contraceptive use impacts both neural dynamics and behavior in women. On the 
neural level, functional connectivity in higher-order brain areas associated with social cognition 
and brain structures related to reward-processing are altered in women using hormonal 
contraception as compared to naturally cycling women (Bonenberger et al., 2013; Petersen, 
Kilpatrick, Goharzad, & Cahill, 2014). On the behavioral level, partner choice, attraction to 
other-sex features (Alvergne & Lummaa, 2010; Feinberg, DeBruine, Jones, & Little, 2008; 
Roberts, Gosling, Carter, & Petrie, 2008), personal satisfaction and quality of life, especially in 
relation to romantic relationships (Roberts et al., 2012), have also been shown to change as a 
function of hormonal contraceptive use. 
In particular, contraceptive use shifts women’s preferences of partner features to less 
masculine features (indicative of low testosterone levels) (Gangestad, Garver-Apgar, Simpson, 
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& Cousins, 2007; Little et al., 2002). Because contraceptive use increases preferences for 
features such as safety and future security, women using hormonal contraceptive are likely to 
be more attracted by more trustworthy partners. This preference was indeed observed in Study 
6, where women using hormonal contraceptives perceived trustworthy faces as more attractive 
despite comparable levels of facial attractiveness across trustworthiness dimensions. These 
findings suggest that pramipexole might intensify such preferences in women using hormonal 
contraceptive. 
 
10.7  Limitations 
These achievements notwithstanding, some limitations have to be addressed that future studies 
need to overcome for better insights into the psychological and neural dynamics that bring about 
trusting behaviors. 
The TAG allowed to disentangle social information from reward information to test 
whether these two types of information independently affect trusting behavior. Further, this 
paradigm allowed me to test whether social and reward information recruit differing brain 
signatures predictive of trust decisions. However, one of the major limitations of the TAG 
relates to the unclear motivational structure in the game for the advisers. As pointed out in the 
introduction, minimizing  external incentives for the advisers was intended to prevent 
participants from tracking the changing probabilistic structure of the incentives of the other and 
to focus on learning about the other’s character instead (Behrens et al., 2008; A. O. Diaconescu 
et al., 2014; Andreea O. Diaconescu et al., 2017). Moreover, participants knew that they were 
going to interact with each other on two consecutive games. Importantly, dependency roles 
were reversed in the two games, as participants depended on the advisers for the outcomes of 
their decisions in the TAG and the advisers on participants for decision outcomes in the TG. 
Thus, participants were given the impression that their advisers were motivated to behave 
honestly in the TAG to form a good reputation that might have paid off in the subsequent 
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interaction in the TG. Despite this, we still lack data about what participants thought the 
advisers’ motivations were to share accurate or inaccurate information or what motivated 
participants themselves to accept the advice. At the end of the experiments, participants 
explicitly reported the strategies underlying their decisions. In line with results from their 
decision patterns, participants’ explicit reports suggest they were indeed deciding whether to 
use advice based on the advisers’ honesty. However, as honesty might also elicit impressions 
of benevolence and good intentions, which are as likely antecedents of trust (Mayer et al., 1995), 
it is still an open question what inferences participants in the role of advisee were making when 
they decided whether to trust an adviser’s advice. 
Secondly, to computationally capture learning dynamics during the trusting interaction, 
reinforcement learning models were employed that mathematically formalized participants’ 
decisions. This choice was based on previous studies that have provided evidence for their 
suitability of these models (Biele et al., 2009; Biele et al., 2011; Chang et al., 2010). One of 
these studies has also shown that reinforcement learning models outperform other models such 
as Bayesian models (Biele et al., 2009). However, Study 4 did not confirm this assumption with 
a direct comparison of the employed reinforcement learning models with other models. Trust 
learning dynamics in the TAG might have been described by other, equally likely models. For 
example, Bayesian modeling has been shown to optimally describe how individuals integrate 
information about others’ competence (Toelch et al., 2014). Bayesian models might help gain 
insights into the asymmetry in information weighting observed in Study 4. For instance, the 
observed learning impairment for honest advisers is likely due to participants’ initial positive 
expectations of the other. These expectations might have functioned as priors for participants’ 
behaviors in the very first stages of the social interaction. As positive expectations are 
reinforced, they plausibly fostered the formation of strong posteriors that contributed to the 
discounting of new inconsistent evidence. Bayesian accounts could have captured these 
dynamics of belief formation and updating. Thus, the absence of a comparison between 
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reinforcement learning models and other types of computational models represents an important 
limitation to the generalizability of the formalization of the observed learning patterns. 
Thirdly, results of the pharmacological studies need to be replicated in a bigger sample 
size. In particular, the predictive framework based on a leave-one-subject-out cross-validation 
approach in our small sample of 27 participants might have been affected by unstable and biased 
estimates that compromise the reliability of our conclusions (Varoquaux, 2017; Varoquaux et 
al., 2017). The problem is that estimates of variance across cross-validation folds strongly 
underestimate errors on the prediction accuracy, leading to big error bars. Moreover, future 
studies might also consider acquiring more subject-level data to use other cross-validation 
approaches. For instance, the 80-20 cross-validation approach (i.e., training the algorithm on 
80% of the data and testing it on the remaining 20%) might provide less biased estimates and 
thus more reliable results (Varoquaux et al., 2017). 
Finally, despite the relevance of providing novel pharmacological evidence on the 
influence of a dopamine agonist on trusting behaviors, some important issues have to be 
addressed also for the last study. Due to gender differences in pharmacological interventions 
using dopaminergic drugs (Munro et al., 2006; Soutschek et al., 2017), we tried to avoid gender 
variability by limiting our sample to female participants. However, this choice reduces the 
generalizability of the observed results. Thus, future studies need to replicate these results in a 
mixed sample. Further, interpretations of the interaction between pramipexole intake and 
hormonal contraceptive use in affecting behavioral trust are limited by the lack of data on 
contraceptive type used by the female sample. Different types of hormonal contraceptives may 
interact in different ways with pharmacological modulations of brain dynamics (Petersen et al., 
2014). In addition, a previous study has found weak, but significant evidence on the effects of 
endogenous sex hormones on interpersonal trust during the preovulatory phase in a sample of 
12 naturally cycling women (Ball et al., 2013). As we could not control for menstrual cycle 
phases, future studies are needed to check whether results hold also after controlling for sex 
 74  
hormones in naturally cycling women. Lastly, the absence of any data on the binding profile of 
pramipexole limits the insights we can gain into the relationships between dopamine and trust. 
Hence, future studies using more suitable techniques, such as positron emission tomography, 
are needed to overcome this issue. 
 
10.8  Future directions 
Building on the results provided here, future research might initiate follow-up investigations to 
extend and complement the knowledge we have acquired from the discussed studies. A possible 
research line may closely examine the bias in information sampling and processing observed in 
Chapter 7. For instance, how do decision-makers weigh the same piece of information (e.g., 
positive and negative outcomes) learnt via social and asocial learning? Do uninformed decision-
makers (e.g., who lack previous knowledge about a particular context or about the other) 
integrate new information in a more biased fashion (for instance, relying more on social 
learning)? To which extent do decision-makers accept making suboptimal choices and be 
vulnerable to others’ exploitation? 
One hypothesis is that information from others, especially from those we trust, is 
associated with a “social premium” that biases information sampling and processing, 
particularly in uninformed decision-makers. This bias may be further nourished by reputational 
concerns, for which individuals may accept taking poor advice to signal trustworthiness and 
induce the partner to reciprocate in the future. The underlying neural mechanisms might relate 
to bias-dependent activation patterns in different brain regions: on the one hand, in brain regions 
associated with learning and prediction error processing (e.g., striatum; Biele et al., 2011); on 
the other, in regions known to undertake value computations (e.g., VMPFC and OFC; Bartra, 
McGuire, & Kable, 2013; Sescousse et al., 2010) and inferences on others’ mental states (e.g., 
pTPJ; Igelstrom & Graziano, 2017; Igelström et al., 2015; Igelström et al., 2016; Koster-Hale 
et al., 2017; Saxe & Powell, 2006; L. Young et al., 2010; L. Young & Saxe, 2008). 
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Unearthing the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying the integration of 
information from feedback will shed light on decision-making in particular and human 
cognition in general. Insights into how information is integrated by a decision-maker before a 
decision is made will be of pivotal importance to other research fields such as political sciences, 
economics and nutritional sciences, as similar mechanisms may be involved when individuals 
decide for whom to vote, which house to buy or what to eat for dinner. Finally, this line of 
research may provide a testable account to pinpoint the dynamics of clinical symptoms, such 
as repetitive behaviors in obsessive compulsive disorder or autism in which behavioral rigidity 
likely hinges on an abnormal integration and evaluation of feedback (Just, Cherkassky, Keller, 
& Minshew, 2004; Voon et al., 2014). A better understanding of how different sources of 
information compete and contribute to one’s decisions may enrich our knowledge of human 
cognition, offering a mechanistic framework to improve it. 
Moreover, trust and trustworthiness not only foster cooperation and facilitate binding 
and social integration, they also promote happiness and subjective well-being (Bjørnskov, 2008; 
McCarthy, Wood, & Holmes, 2017). Recently, a movement in the health and medical domains 
has advocated for more trust in medicine. The dominant idea, mainly supported by an economic 
worldview, that a social interaction can be judged solely by its end results (e.g., its profits) is 
unsatisfying. Not least, because the quality of human relations is defined by their transparency 
(Bleakley, 2019). Hence, paradoxically, the health of a patient, and thus the success of a therapy, 
cannot be determined solely by the effectiveness of a drug but also by the type of the 
relationship between the patient and the doctor (Chen, Tseng, & Cheng, 2013; Elgar, 2010). 
Trust underlies the formation and maintenance of a long-lasting, supportive and profound 
relationship between patients and doctors that even predicts reduced mortality (Barker, 
Steventon, & Deeny, 2017; Pereira Gray et al., 2018). On the contrary, lack of trust leads to 
over-diagnosing and over-prescribing––the phenomenon of “too much medicine”, which has 
negative health outcomes (Fritz & Holton, 2019). 
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The psychological and neurobiological mechanisms set in motion by trust and that 
positively contribute to an individual’s subjective well-being are still unexplored. One 
hypothesis mentioned at the end of Chapter 5 states that trust might act as a social buffer, 
reducing stress levels and thus improving mental and physical well-being. For example, trust 
might reduce the perception of decision and outcome uncertainty on the one hand, and the 
severity of negative outcomes on the other. It might allow for strategies of social support that 
enable the sharing of responsibility and the burden of difficult decisions with others. In this 
direction goes preliminary evidence that trust promotes the disclosure of distress (McCarthy et 
al., 2017). If trust facilitates disclosure of negative emotions, it might set in motion a virtuous 
loop of emotional disclosure and supportive feedback that improves one’s ability to cope with 
difficult and stressful situations. 
The neuropeptide oxytocin, which plays a pivotal role in affiliation, social attachment 
but also cortisol-level reduction (Panksepp, 2004; L. J. Young & Wang, 2004), might be part 
of the neurobiological mechanisms that underlie these effects of trust. However, to date, 
empirical investigations on this topic are still rare. To my knowledge, only one study has 
pharmacologically investigated the effects of oxytocin on trust in a multi-round TG, finding 
that oxytocin impairs learning mechanisms that would allow for an adaptive change of trusting 
strategies. However, it left initial levels of trust intact (T. Baumgartner, Heinrichs, Vonlanthen, 
Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2008). Such an impairment was mirrored by reduced activations in the 
midbrain and striatum, which, as seen in the introduction, are dopaminergic brain regions 
pivotal to prediction error encoding and learning. Given evidence from animal studies that 
oxytocin modulates neural activity in the nucleus accumbens and ventral pallidum (Insel & 
Young, 2001; L. J. Young, Lim, Gingrich, & Insel, 2001), these findings based on a multi-
round TG point again to a successful modulation of learning mechanisms during a trusting 
interaction but leave yet again the question as to what role oxytocin plays in trustworthiness 
impressions and behavioral trust unanswered. 
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Conclusions 
Taken together, the results outlined in this dissertation demonstrate that honesty is a central 
determinant of trustworthiness perceptions and trusting behavior. Honest others are quickly 
identified, and a reputational tag is attached to them that might ease decision-making processes 
in future encounters. In difficult situations, in which we are required to make a decision, relying 
on others might reduce the burden of the decision-making process. Preliminary evidence in 
animal and human research has indicated that trust might serve as a psychological buffer against 
stress and pain (Burkett et al., 2016; Coan, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006; Inagaki & Eisenberger, 
2012; Kikusui et al., 2006; Yanagisawa et al., 2011). In animals, the mere presence of a peer 
reduces stress levels in fear-conditioned rats (Davitz & Mason, 1955; Morozov & Ito, 2019). 
Thus, trust might as well buffer the stress related to a difficult decision in our everyday life. 
Conversely, interacting with dishonest others might be more stressful, as dishonest 
others do not appear to have an intrinsic motivation to commit to the other’s well-being. As 
such, dishonest others might exploit us or simply let us down by providing false or poor 
information. A decision-maker who has observed signs of dishonesty might prefer refraining 
from interacting with those unreliable others. However, when this cannot be avoided, a 
decision-maker might be in a state of high alertness and might constantly track the other’s 
actions to anticipate disadvantageous outcomes. This might explain the flexible behavioral 
adaption observed in Study 1-4 for dishonest advisers. 
Notably, honesty-based trustworthiness was encoded in cortical brain regions associated 
with higher-order cognition and the neural signal in these regions was informative of future 
trust decisions. These results outline a specific neural model of honesty-based trust. First, an 
individual interacting with another and trying to figure out whether she is trustworthy needs to 
understand the other’s intentions and evaluate her character. This elicits cognitive processes 
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that recruit brain regions associated with inferences on others’ mental state (i.e., pTPJ and PCC) 
(Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010; Koster-Hale et al., 2017; Mar, 
2011; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003) and representations of others’ character traits (i.e., VMPFC) 
(Hackel et al., 2015; R. J. Murray et al., 2012; Welborn & Lieberman, 2015). Second, lateral 
prefrontal (e.g., DLPFC) and parietal regions (e.g., IPL) associated with executive functions 
and top-down control might be engaged to allow for flexible behavioral revisions based on the 
updated beliefs about the other’s character. 
These results raise the question as to how these brain regions are engaged when 
individuals are presented with contradictory evidence about another’s social character. 
Preliminary evidence from Study 4 suggests that the psychological mechanisms allowing for 
successful belief updating might be hampered by previous knowledge about the other’s honest 
reputation. This phenomenon could be traced back to a difference in information weighting. 
Interestingly, a similar asymmetry in the encoding of information from advisers was observed 
in the OFC (Study 3), suggesting that this brain region might play a pivotal role in successful 
belief formation and updating in social interactions. 
Finally, administration of a dopamine agonist successfully modulated resting-state brain 
dynamics in subcortical and medial prefrontal regions and was seen to impact trusting behaviors 
based on subjective impressions of facial trustworthiness. Notably, this effect interacted with 
the use of common hormonal contraceptives in women. These preliminary results indicate 
complex neural dynamics between trust and the dopaminergic system. First of all, dopamine 
does not seem to affect subjective trustworthiness impressions but specifically modulates the 
behavioral component of trust. Second, this dopaminergic modulation cannot be explained by 
learning mechanisms, since Study 6 was explicitly designed to control for such a possible 
confound. Third, the role of dopamine in trust needs to be considered from a broader framework 
of the interplay between dopamine and other neural dynamics/systems. Four, the possible role 
of sex hormones in trust might relate not only to sex differences but also to interindividual 
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differences in one’s willingness to trust. For instance, hormonal fluctuations in women might 
be reflected by slight variations of trust over time. Future studies are needed to address these 
open questions. 
By providing, on the one hand, evidence of the psychological and neural dynamics 
underlying honest reputation and its influence on trusting behaviors, and by highlighting, on 
the other, the pharmacological impact of a dopamine agonist on impression-based trust, these 
studies have notable implications for our society and far-reaching consequences not only for 
research in psychology, neuroscience and pharmacology, but also medicine and politics. 
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Theoretical accounts propose honesty as a central determinant of trustworthiness perceptions 16 
and trusting behavior. However, behavioral and neural evidence on the relationships between 17 
honesty and trust is missing. Combining a novel paradigm that successfully induces 18 
trustworthiness perceptions with functional MRI and multivariate analyses, we demonstrate that 19 
honesty-based trustworthiness is represented in the posterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral 20 
prefrontal cortex and intraparietal sulcus. Crucially, brain signal in these regions predicts 21 
individual trust in a subsequent social interaction with the same partners after the scanning 22 
session. Importantly, honesty recruited the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), and 23 
stronger functional connectivity between the VMPFC and temporoparietal junction during 24 
honesty encoding was associated with higher trust in the subsequent interaction. These results 25 
suggest that honesty signals in the VMPFC are integrated into trustworthiness beliefs to inform 26 
present and future social behaviors. These findings improve our understanding of the neural 27 
representations of an individual’s social character that guide behaviors during interpersonal 28 
interactions. 29 
  30 
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Trust is the essential component of social life enabling successful cooperation and fostering 31 
individuals’ well-being. The factors that induce trust in others remain, however, still largely 32 
unexplored. To date, at least two accounts have been proposed to explain an individual’s 33 
trust in others. 34 
One account proposes that interacting agents focus on maximizing their personal 35 
payoffs during social exchanges1. This account assumes that optimally rational agents trust 36 
another as long as they will be better off with trusting than distrusting2. Empirical 37 
investigations implementing economic games such as the trust game (TG) confirm that 38 
people are willing to trust others as long as trusting leads to monetary rewards3,4. However, 39 
trust levels drop significantly when external incentives lack or when trust leads to monetary 40 
losses5,6. 41 
An alternative account argues that individuals take into account the social character 42 
and attitudes of the interacting partner when trusting. In this regard, individuals seek to form 43 
beliefs about the other’s social character by focusing on whether the other’s behavior fosters 44 
fairness, equality and cooperation7,8. Honesty, that is, the quality of being reliable and the 45 
tendency to share truthful information, has been proposed as a central determinant of 46 
trustworthiness perceptions promoting prosocial behaviors9,10. For instance, altruistic 47 
behavior, unconditional kindness and reciprocity have been observed in response to others’ 48 
honesty11-14. However, whether honesty also encourages others to trust is yet unexplored. 49 
These two accounts make different predictions on the neural mechanisms underlying 50 
trust. When individuals focus on the trade-off between advantageous and disadvantageous 51 
consequences following a trust decision, brain regions signaling actual or hypothetical decision 52 
outcomes (such as the ventral striatum and dorsal anterior insula) should be recruited in trusting 53 
interactions15-18. On the contrary, if trust draws on the social character of the other, brain regions 54 
associated with social evaluations (such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, VMPFC, and 55 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, DLPFC) and inferences on the other’s intentions (e.g., the 56 
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posterior temporoparietal junction, pTPJ) should be engaged during trusting behaviors19-22. 57 
However, to date, evidence on the brain regions representing the honest character of another is 58 
still missing. 59 
In this study, we investigated for the first time whether information about the other’s 60 
honest character evokes trustworthiness perceptions that predict future trust in the other. 61 
Importantly, a trustworthy reputation has been suggested to impact information processing 62 
during social learning. In particular, although individuals prefer to interact with, and learn from, 63 
trustworthy partners23, beliefs about the other’s trustworthiness bias how information from the 64 
trustworthy other is processed and learnt24,25. An explanatory hypothesis for such bias posits 65 
that beliefs about the other’s trustworthiness modulate evaluations of information from 66 
trustworthy others. For instance, previous work has linked biased beliefs about others’ 67 
reciprocity to differences in how information is encoded in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)26, a 68 
region of pivotal importance in value representation27. However, it is still unknown whether 69 
honest reputation modulates information encoding and whether the OFC plays a role in such 70 
biased information processing. 71 
Here, we developed a trust-inducing paradigm (Take Advice Game, TAG), which 72 
enables us to isolate social evaluation signals related to the other person’s trustworthiness 73 
(learnt through the other’s honest and dishonest behavior) from nonsocial value signals 74 
related to one’s task performance (i.e., neural responses to winnings and losses). Being able 75 
to disentangle these two types of information was of pivotal importance to the two main 76 
objectives of this study. On one hand, it allowed us to isolate brain signals related to 77 
representations of the other’s honest character. On the other, it enabled us to investigate any 78 
modulatory effects of the other’s honest character on information processing. In the TAG, 79 
participants, in the role of advisee, had to learn the trustworthiness of advisers from 80 
feedback about their honest or dishonest advice. After the TAG, participants, in the role of 81 
investor, played a one-shot TG with the advisers who advised them previously. 82 
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Using multivariate voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) in combination with functional 83 
MRI (fMRI), we examined the relationships between honesty, dishonesty and trust on both 84 
behavioral and neural level. On the behavioral level, we hypothesized that honest behavior 85 
would increase trust irrespective of proximal benefits associated with the act of trust. On 86 
the neural level, representations of the other’s trustworthiness in brain regions associated 87 
with higher-order cognition would predict individual, behavioral trust across contexts. 88 
Finally, we hypothesized that the other’s honesty would modulate neural responses to 89 
positive and negative outcomes in brain regions associated with value computations. 90 
 
Fig. 1. Paradigms 
A. Schematic representation of the Take Advice Game (TAG). Advisers were given information about one of 
the two cards and could communicate this information to the advisee. Participants, in the role of advisees, made 
a decision based on the information received (decision phase). In the feedback phase, advisees saw the actual 
numbers on the cards, which informed them about the adviser’s honest behavior (honest vs. dishonest), and a 
green or red circle, which informed them whether they won or lost, respectively. B. After the TAG, participants 
in the role of investor played a one-shot trust game (TG) with the advisers now in the role of trustee. Investors 
received a monetary endowment and decided whether they wanted to entrust some of this amount with the 
trustees. Investors were told that the shared amount was tripled by the experimenter and passed on to the trustee, 
who could decide to share back any portion of the tripled amount. See also Figure S1. 






Paradigms. In the TAG (Fig. 1A & Fig. S1), participants in the role of advisee had to rely on 93 
the advice of different advisers to choose the highest of two cards. As participants did not have 94 
any information about the cards’ numbers, they depended on the honesty of the advisers’ advice 95 
for their decisions. The advisers, on the other hand, could see only one of the two cards, that is, 96 
they knew more than the advisees but did not have complete information about the cards. Hence, 97 
their advice was not which was the winning card participants should pick but rather additional 98 
information about the number of one of the two cards. In each trial, participants were paired 99 
with a different adviser (adviser phase). After the adviser sent his advice (advice phase), the 100 
advisee decided which card she wanted to pick (decision phase). Finally, the cards were 101 
disclosed to the advisee (feedback phase), who could see whether the adviser had been honest 102 
and whether she won or lost in that trial. Participants could win/lose €1 in each trial by choosing 103 
the card with the higher/lower number. After the TAG, participants in the role of investor played 104 
a one-shot TG with the advisers now in the role of trustee (Fig. 1B). Investors were paired with 105 
each trustee and received an initial endowment of 10 monetary units that they could share with 106 
the partner. Investors were told that the shared amount would be tripled by the experimenter 107 
and passed on to the trustee who, in turn, could decide to share back any amount of it. 108 
 109 
Link between honesty and trusting behavior. First, we tested whether honesty is associated 110 
with higher trust levels across contexts and regardless of proximal gains. In the TAG, 111 
individuals should be more willing to take the advice of honest advisers and distrust the advice 112 
of dishonest advisers. Our results demonstrate that participants took on average more advice 113 
from honest than dishonest others (t(30) = 3.68; p < .001; 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.03, 114 
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0.10]; Cohen’s d = 0.7; Fig. 2A). Importantly, participants grounded their decisions to take an 115 
advice in the trustworthiness character of the adviser (i.e., whether the adviser was honest or 116 
dishonest; β = 0.38; standard error (SE) = 0.12; 95% CI = [0.14, 0.62]; p = .007). On the contrary, 117 
monetary winnings and losses did not impact participants’ decisions to take an adviser’s advice 118 
(β = -0.001; SE = 0.07; 95% CI = [-0.14, 0.14]; p = .980; Tab. 1). This suggests that our 119 
participants trusted an adviser based on the adviser’s trustworthy behavior and irrespective of 120 
their proximal benefits. Indeed, the majority of our participants (M = 88.2%) explicitly reported 121 
in an exit questionnaire (see Methods) that their decisions were based on the trustworthiness 122 
and advice of the advisers. Importantly, participants applied such trustworthiness-based 123 
strategy even though they were aware that it was not successful to gain more benefits (!" = 124 
13.68, p = .0002). 125 
Moreover, although trust in the other’s advice was comparable for both honest and 126 
dishonest advisers in the very first trials of the TAG, participants quickly adjusted their behavior 127 
to the other’s honesty over the course of the social interaction (Fig. 2A). Indeed, participants’ 128 
advice-taking behaviors toward the two advisers differed increasingly over time (# = 0.01; SE 129 
= 0.006; 95% CI = [0.0001, 0.024]; p = .048), especially due to a significant, linear decrease in 130 
trust in the advice of dishonest advisers (# = -0.02; SE = 0.007; 95% CI = [-0.028, -0.002]; p 131 
= .021). On the contrary, advice-taking behavior toward honest advisers did not significantly 132 
change over time (# = -0.005; SE = 0.006; 95% CI = [-0.016, 0.007]; p = .410). 133 
 



















Regressor ! (SE) CI 
Intercept 2.01 (0.33)** 1.37, 2.64 
Honest adviser 0.38 (0.12)* 0.14, 0.62 
Advised Number -0.17 (0.07) -0.30, -0.03 
Advised Card 0.02 (0.07) -0.11, 0.15 
Feedback previous trial -0.001 (0.07) -0.14, 0.14 
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β coefficients (standard errors) from the generalized mixed-effects 
logistic regression model with maximal random-effects structure 
predicting advice-taking behavior (1=advice taken; 0=advice not 
taken). SE, standard error; CI, confidence interval. *p < .01; **p 
< .001 
 134 
Second, we investigated whether these specific effects of the other’s trustworthiness on 135 
advice-taking behavior in the TAG generalize to a different context and measure of trust (i.e., 136 
the TG). Our results confirm this, showing that advice-taking behavior in the TAG correlated 137 
with subsequent, economic trust decisions in the TG on average ($(29) = .39; p = .031), and 138 
separately for both honest ($(29) = .41; p = .021) and dishonest advisers ($(29) = -.37; p = .040). 139 
That is, the more likely participants were to trust the advice of an adviser, the more willing they 140 
were to entrust that adviser with money in a subsequent interaction (Fig. 2B). As expected, the 141 
amount of money shared with the advisers in the TG did not significantly correlate with 142 
participants’ monetary winnings in the TAG either on average ($ (29) = .17; p = .350) or 143 
separately for the two advisers (honest adviser: $(29) = .30; p = .106; dishonest adviser: $(29) 144 
= .01; p = .978). These results confirm that economic trust decisions in the TG did not represent 145 
a form of repayment for the benefits participants obtained from the adviser’s advice in the 146 
previous interaction but rather reflected participants’ willingness to trust the adviser’s honesty 147 
in advice giving. 148 
Finally, we checked the proportion of positive and negative feedback received by our 149 
participants. Participants received on average the same amount of positive and negative 150 
feedback (mean difference = 0.0013 ± SD = 0.07; t(30) = 0.11; p = 0.916), despite more positive 151 
feedback for honest than dishonest advisers (honest advisers: M = 63.5% ± SD = 7.4; dishonest 152 
advisers: M = 56.7% ± SD = 5.0; t(30) = 4.09; p < 0.001). 153 




Figure 2. Behavioral results 
A. Trusting behavior in the take advice game over runs (left) and on average (right) toward honest and dishonest 
advisers. Data points on the left were interpolated for visualization purposes and shadowed areas represent 
standard errors. White lines in the box-plots on the right represent average advice-taking behavior across 
participants. Each black dot represents one participant. B. Amount of money entrusted in the trust game with 
honest (left) and dishonest (right) others. Each dot represents one participant. *** p < .001. 
 
 154 
Neural representations of trustworthiness. Next, we examined the common neural patterns of 155 
advisers’ trustworthiness and value information related to participants’ performance. In so 156 
doing, we investigated whether these neural patterns capitalize on similar brain regions 157 
informative of individual trust. Our task design elegantly allows this, since in the feedback 158 
phase, participants received information about the other’s trustworthiness (honest/dishonest 159 
behavior) and their own task performance (winnings/losses). Hence, applying a whole-brain 160 
searchlight MVPA to neural activations during the feedback phase with a leave-one-run-out 161 
cross-validation (LOROCV) procedure (Fig. 3A), we separately decoded trustworthiness and 162 
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value information to identify the trustworthiness decoding network and value decoding network, 163 
respectively. To this end, a support vector machine (SVM) was trained on beta parameters 164 
estimated using two general linear models (GLMs) that coded trustworthiness information 165 
(GLM1) and value information (GLM2) in the feedback phase (see Methods). 166 
The trustworthiness decoding network revealed clusters with classification accuracy 167 
above chance in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), right and left DLPFC, and left IPS 168 
(cluster-level, family-wise error corrected, FWEc, < .05; Fig. 3B & Tab. S1). Signal in these 169 
brain regions was able to classify the neural patterns of honesty and dishonesty of out-of-sample 170 
individuals with 68% accuracy (sensitivity: 68%; specificity: 68%; p < .0001, based on a 171 
nonparametric test of 10,000 permutations; Fig. 3C). On the contrary, the value decoding 172 
network consisted mainly of regions in the medial PFC extending from the anterior cingulate 173 
cortex (ACC) to the striatum (voxel-level FWE < .05; Fig. 3D & Tab. S1). Signal in these brain 174 
regions was able to classify the neural patterns of positive and negative outcomes of out-of-175 
sample individuals with 82% accuracy (sensitivity: 87%; specificity: 77%; p < .0002; Fig. 3E). 176 
Hence, these analyses indicate a specific neural network representing the other’s social 177 
character (i.e., trustworthiness) that could be separated from neural signal representing value 178 
information. To note, classification accuracy of value information was much better than 179 
classification accuracy of social character information. These results concur with previous 180 
findings28 and may hinge on the nature of social concepts, which are distributed neural 181 
representations that might be difficult to fully capture using an anatomical-based searchlight 182 
approach. 183 
Finally, we set out to characterize the peculiar functional associations of the 184 
trustworthiness decoding network. We first ran GLM analyses to control for possible confounds 185 
of the observed neural patterns. In particular, we computed another GLM1 adding parametric 186 
modulators to the feedback phase for risk (as mean squared deviation from the expected 187 
outcome given the adviser’s advice) and congruency (as deviance of the adviser’s advice from 188 
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the actual card number on the advised card). These analyses revealed that our results hold also 189 
after controlling for these factors (Fig. S2). Second, using meta-analytic functional decoding 190 
(neurosynth.org)29, we quantitatively evaluated the representational similarity of the 191 
trustworthiness decoding network with neural activation patterns associated with specific 192 
psychological components. In particular, we compared the neural signatures of trustworthiness 193 
in our study against reverse inference meta-analytic neural patterns of neural images of previous 194 
studies stored in the Neurosynth database and associated with particular psychological terms. 195 
For this analysis, we chose twelve terms associated with the social and nonsocial domains, such 196 
as social cognition, theory of mind, rewards, congruency and risk (Fig. S3). Results demonstrate 197 
that the trustworthiness decoding network was preferentially associated with psychological 198 
terms related to mentalizing and social cognition (Fig. S3), validating the ability of our task in 199 
singling out neural patterns that likely underlie the formation of trustworthiness beliefs about 200 
the advisers. Next, we set up to test this peculiar functional role of the trustworthiness decoding 201 
network in representing the trustworthiness character of others. 202 
 
Figure 3. Decoding honesty and predicting trust 
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In two MVPAs applied to the feedback phase of the TAG (A), a support vector machine (SVM) was trained to 
decode honest and dishonest advice (GLM1) to determine the trustworthiness decoding network (upper), and to 
decode winnings and losses (GLM2) to determine the value decoding network (lower). The trustworthiness 
decoding network (B) included regions such as the PCC, DLPFC and IPS, and could successfully distinguish 
neural patterns for honesty and dishonesty in out-of-sample individuals (C). The value decoding network (D) 
included the striatum and ACC and could successfully distinguish neural patterns for winnings and losses in 
out-of-sample individuals (E) Finally, a multivariate prediction analysis with support vector regression (SVR) 
showed that the neural patterns of the trustworthiness decoding network successfully predicted individual 
economic trust decisions in the TG, thereby showing across-context generalizability (F). Both out-of-sample 
classification and prediction analyses were based on a leave-one-subject-out cross-validation procedure and 
their significance tested using a permutation test with 10,000 permutations. Each dot represents one participant. 
See also Figure S2 and Table S1. 
MVPA, multivariate voxel pattern analysis; TAG, take advice game; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; IPS, 
intraparietal sulcus; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; TG, trust game. 
Heatmap represents t values. 
 203 
Neural representations of trustworthiness predict trust. A central feature of the neural 204 
representation of a character trait, such as trustworthiness, is its ability to inform decisions 205 
across contexts30. Thus, neural patterns decoding the other’s trustworthiness (i.e., within the 206 
trustworthiness decoding network, but not within the value decoding network) should be able 207 
to predict individual trust decisions in the TG. To test this, a multivariate prediction analysis 208 
with a leave-one-subject-out cross-validation (LOSOCV) procedure was performed. Prediction 209 
significance was tested against a random distribution of 10,000 permutations. Results 210 
demonstrate that the trustworthiness decoding network significantly predicted the amount of 211 
money entrusted in the TG by out-of-sample individuals (standardized mean squared error, 212 
smse, = .80; p < .007; Fig. 3F & Fig. S4). On the contrary, the predictive model based on the 213 
value decoding network did not yield a significant prediction (smse = 1.06; p = .84; Fig. S4). 214 
By showing that neural patterns decoding trustworthiness information about others predict an 215 
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individual’s willingness to trust in a different social context, these findings indicate a peculiar 216 
functional role of those trustworthiness-decoding brain regions in representing behaviorally-217 
relevant information about others’ social characters. 218 
 219 
Stronger integration of honesty signals correlates with higher trust. MVPA identified neural 220 
patterns of brain signals entailing information about others’ trustworthiness that were 221 
informative of an individual’s trusting behavior and were different from neural patterns related 222 
to value information. To further characterize brain regions more strongly recruited by honesty 223 
and dishonesty, and to test whether and how honesty modulates neural activations encoding 224 
value information, whole-brain univariate analyses were performed on the brain signal during 225 
the feedback phase. 226 
Contrast analyses between honesty and dishonesty revealed that dishonesty more 227 
strongly activated bilateral DLPFC, left IPS and IPL (FWEc < .05; Fig. 4A & Tab. S2), while 228 
the VMPFC and ACC were significantly more engaged by honesty (FWEc < .05; Fig. 4B & 229 
Tab. S2). These results indicate a stronger reliance of dishonesty on brain regions within the 230 
trustworthiness decoding network, suggesting that dishonesty likely requires recruitment of 231 
brain regions representing the other’s character to constantly optimize one’s beliefs about the 232 
other. On the contrary, honesty more strongly relies on medial prefrontal areas associated with 233 
evaluations of positive qualities of others and self. 234 




Figure 4. Honesty vs. Dishonesty 
Univariate contrasts revealed that brain areas within the trustworthiness decoding network (i.e., IPL and 
DLPFC) were more engaged by dishonesty than honesty (A), whereas honesty more strongly recruited the 
VMPFC (B). Error bars indicate standard errors across participants. 
IPL, inferior parietal lobule; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; VMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; 
a.u., arbitary units. Heatmap represents t values. 
 235 
In particular, as the VMPFC has previously been shown to be functionally connected 236 
with brain regions associated with social cognition during socially-relevant computations31, we 237 
reasoned that honesty signals in the VMPFC may be integrated into beliefs about the other’s 238 
social character via functional connectivity with brain regions associated with social cognition. 239 
To define these potential pathways, task-dependent functional connectivity analyses were 240 
implemented using the VMPFC as seed region. Functional connectivity analyses show that the 241 
VMPFC was more strongly functionally coupled to the left pTPJ (-40,-50,30, x,y,z; FWEsvc 242 
< .05; Fig. 5A) during honesty encoding than dishonesty encoding. Further, if the information 243 
flow between the VMPFC and left pTPJ during the feedback phase were specifically associated 244 
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with the formation of beliefs about the other’s trustworthiness, this connectivity signal would 245 
be related to subsequent trust decisions but not to individual monetary winnings. Indeed, 246 
functional connectivity between the VMPFC and left pTPJ during honesty and dishonesty 247 
encoding in the TAG significantly correlated with the amount of money entrusted in the TG to 248 
honest ($(29) = .54; p < .002) and dishonest ($(29) = .48; p = .006) advisers (Fig. 5B). On the 249 
contrary, no significant correlations were found between individual winnings and the VMPFC-250 
pTPJ connectivity for either honest ($(29) = .29; p = .111) or dishonest ($(29) = .11; p = .542) 251 
advisers (Fig. 5C). These results suggest that functional connectivity between the VMPFC and 252 
left pTPJ likely reflects integration of honesty information into knowledge about the other’s 253 
social character. Specifically, stronger integration of honesty signal from the VMPFC into the 254 
pTPJ led to higher trust in others in a subsequent interaction, suggesting that the more 255 
participants believed the other to be honest, the more they trusted them. 256 
 
Figure 5. Task-based functional connectivity analysis 
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Task-based functional connectivity between the VMPFC and left pTPJ was stronger for honesty than dishonesty 
(A). Critically, this functional connectivity correlated with an individual’s willingness to trust in the TG (B) but 
not with one’s payoffs in the TAG (C). Blue dots on correlation plots on the left represent behaviors toward 
honest advisers, orange dots on correlation plots on the right represent behaviors toward dishonest advisers. 
Each dot represents one participant. 
VMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; pTPJ, posterior temporo-parietal junction; PPI, psychophysiological 
interaction; a.u., arbitary units. Heatmap represents t values. 
 257 
Honesty biases value information processing. We then turned to test whether and how these 258 
specific activation patterns of honesty and dishonesty modulate brain responses to value 259 
information during the feedback phase. Previous behavioral studies have suggested that positive 260 
qualities of others bias information processing24,25. Such a bias may hinge on trait-dependent 261 
differences in neural responses to novel information. We tested this hypothesis by looking at 262 
how honesty and dishonesty modulate neural responses to positive and negative outcomes (i.e., 263 
GLM3, see Methods). 264 
We first examined the neural responses to positive and negative outcomes during 265 
interactions with honest and dishonest advisers separately. Positive outcomes during both 266 
interactions with honest and dishonest advisers elicited similar activations in the striatum, and 267 
for honest advisers, these activations extended to the OFC (Tab. S3). On the other hand, 268 
negative outcomes similarly engaged the middle cingulate cortex and inferior frontal gyrus for 269 
both honest and dishonest others (Tab. S4). Next, we investigated the modulatory effects of 270 
honesty and dishonesty on positive and negative outcomes. This analysis revealed that brain 271 
regions encoding positive and negative outcomes were differently modulated by honesty and 272 
dishonesty. In particular, neural brain signal in the parietal cortex was modulated by dishonesty 273 
during both positive (right IPL; FWEc < .05; Fig. 6A) and negative (left IPS; FWEc < .05; Fig. 274 
6B) outcomes (Tab. S5). On the contrary, honesty modulation of neural responses to outcomes 275 
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was found only in the OFC during positive outcomes (FWEc < .05; Fig. 6C). These results 276 
indicate an asymmetry in the neural responses to positive and negative outcomes for honesty. 277 
 
Figure 6. Honesty modulation of feedback-related signal 
Whole-brain contrast analyses from GLM3 on the feedback phase yielded significant activations in the parietal 
cortex for dishonesty during both positive (A) and negative feedback (B). Honesty, on the contrary, modulated 
only positive feedback in the OFC (C). An ROI analysis (D) indicated higher activity in the OFC in response 
to positive feedback when interacting with honest advisers. Error bars indicate standard errors across 
participants. See also Table S3, S4 and S5. 
ROI, region of interest; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; IPS, intraparietal sulcus; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; a.u., 
arbitrary units. Heatmap represents t values. 
 278 
Using an independent ROI in the OFC, we more closely examined in a post-hoc ROI 279 
analysis this asymmetric honesty modulation of positive feedback processing (Fig. 6D). 280 
Activity in the OFC was significantly higher in response to positive outcomes when interacting 281 
with honest advisers as opposed to dishonest advisers (honesty: M = -0.08; SD = 0.46; 282 
dishonesty: M = -0.44; SD = 0.35; t(30) = 4.72; p < .0001, CI = [0.21, 0.52]; Cohen’s d = 0.85), 283 
while OFC activity during negative outcomes was comparable for the two advisers (honesty: 284 
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M = -0.45; SD = 0.71; dishonesty: M = -0.57; SD = 0.65; t(30) = 1.16; p = .257, CI = [-0.10, 285 
0.36]; Cohen’s d = 0.21). This asymmetry in the neural responses to positive outcomes in the 286 
OFC suggests that feedback information processing may be biased during interactions with 287 
honest others. 288 
 289 
Discussion 290 
Understanding others is pivotal for successful cooperation. In particular, the other’s character 291 
may function as a proxy for the other’s likely behavior in a future encounter. Thus, trustworthy 292 
partners are likely to be trusted in the future, while untrustworthy others are likely to be avoided. 293 
In this study, we showed that the honest character of an advisor makes others more likely to 294 
accept the adviser’s advice and more willing to trust the adviser in a subsequent interaction. 295 
Moreover, neural signatures in the DLPFC, IPS and PCC representing the other’s 296 
trustworthiness predicted individual trust in the partner, and stronger integration of honesty 297 
signal from the VMPFC into the pTPJ correlated with higher trust in the other. 298 
If no prior information about how the other will behave is provided, individuals try to 299 
gather evidence about the other’s social character to inform their decisions. Over the course of 300 
multiple interactions, signs of the other’s current behavior lay the groundwork for the formation 301 
of beliefs about the other’s reputation32. Consistently with previous models of trust9, being 302 
reliable and telling the truth contributes to an honest reputation that makes others more likely 303 
to accept advice. On the contrary, when our participants realized that their initial trust in the 304 
other’s advice was misplaced, they increasingly discounted the other’s advice. Interestingly, 305 
even though the adviser’s advice was not associated with the best option in the game and did 306 
not bring higher benefits to the participants, participants repaid the advisers for their honesty in 307 
advice giving in a future trusting interaction. 308 
As there were no incentives for the advisers to help the advisees (except goodwill or a 309 
good reputation) and the advisees did not commit to reciprocate, the dynamics in play in our 310 
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study resemble real-life scenarios in which individuals need to interact with each other without 311 
requirements or guarantees of the other’s behavior. For instance, trusting someone to give good 312 
advice or keep a secret are acts of trust triggered by perceptions of the other’s trustworthiness 313 
without the requirement of an initial generous act by the trustee33. In these contexts, individuals 314 
likely assume that the other would comply with the shared social norms, which represent a 315 
cluster of expectations an individual can use to make good-enough estimations of the other34. 316 
In subsequent interactions, individuals would need to quickly learn the trustworthiness of the 317 
other based on the other’s actual behavior and eventually adopt better behavioral strategies for 318 
current and future interactions with the partner35. 319 
Thus, trusting someone else in a social interaction requires the ability to form a belief 320 
about the other’s character (i.e., who the other as a person is) and tailor one’s behavior to the 321 
other’s. In our study, we observed that the trustworthiness inferred from the other’s honest or 322 
dishonest behavior was decoded in four brain regions (i.e., the PCC, IPS and bilateral DLPFC), 323 
which were able to successfully classify neural responses to honesty and dishonesty in out-of-324 
sample individuals. In particular, recruitment of the PCC, a central hub of the mentalizing brain 325 
system36,37, is likely related to cognitive processes associated with trait judgments38, while the 326 
IPS, in line with its role in processing expectations related to current goals and stimulus-327 
response selection39, likely sustains attribution of temporary beliefs to others to tune action 328 
selection38,40. Finally, the DLPFC might be responsible for translating the knowledge about the 329 
partner into action. In particular, in line with its role in generous decisions41 and group-based 330 
cooperation42,43, the DLPFC might be involved in the decision to engage in prosocial behaviors 331 
in response to the other’s actions. 332 
Crucially, these brain regions have previously been observed to be interconnected 333 
during interpersonal interactions. In particular, the left IPS shows selective connectivity with 334 
the DLPFC and PCC while understanding others during social interactions30,44,45, suggesting 335 
that these brain regions build an intertwined brain network engaged in representations of 336 
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socially-relevant qualities of others. These representations may form an individual’s behavioral 337 
attitudes based on which adequate behaviors tailored to the other’s character are flexibly 338 
adopted. Moreover, such representations might be retrieved in future interactions with the 339 
partner, as their content is informative of the partner’s character and might hence inform 340 
individual choices that strongly rely on perceptions of the other’s character. In line with this, 341 
we observed that neural signal in the IPS, PCC and bilateral DLPFC predicted future individual 342 
trust during a social interaction (i.e., in the TG) in which participants had to decide whether to 343 
trust the other on the basis of their perceptions of the other’s trustworthiness from the previous 344 
interaction (i.e., in the TAG). 345 
Critically, the IPS, IPL and DLPFC were also more strongly recruited by dishonesty as 346 
opposed to honesty. These findings are in line with previous evidence that the IPS is 347 
consistently activated by others’ non-cooperative behavior46, and that the DLPFC, together with 348 
the IPL, tracks violations of expectations47,48 and decisions to lie49. The recruitment of these 349 
brain regions by dishonesty might reflect the need to constantly track the behaviors of dishonest 350 
others for an online update of one’s beliefs about them and for flexible revision of one’s 351 
behavior. In fact, we observed on the behavioral level that advice-taking behavior toward honest 352 
advisers did not significantly change over time, while participants continuously adapted their 353 
advice-taking behavior for dishonest advisers with a consistent decrease of trust in them over 354 
time. These results suggest that the recruitment of the DLPFC, IPS and IPL is more strongly 355 
required in cases of norm-deviant behaviors (e.g., being dishonest, unfair or noncooperative) to 356 
carefully track the other’s actions and optimally adjust one’s own behavior. 357 
On the contrary, honesty more strongly recruited the VMPFC, a brain region previously 358 
associated with behaviorally-relevant representations of positive traits of others30,50,51. In 359 
particular, the VMPFC was functionally coupled with the left pTPJ during honesty encoding in 360 
the TAG, and the strength of this functional connectivity was further correlated with higher 361 
trust in the adviser during a future interaction in the TG. In line with the role of the pTPJ in 362 
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processing inferences on others’ mental states52,53 and social prediction errors54,55, these 363 
findings suggest that inferences on the other’s intentions undertaken by the pTPJ might be 364 
supported by integration of novel, incoming information about the other’s honesty encoded in 365 
the VMPFC. Interestingly, a recent work indicates that connectivity of the left pTPJ with other 366 
social cognition regions supports behavioral trust and that an experimentally-induced disruption 367 
of trust (via aversive affect) was concomitantly followed by the suppression of pTPJ 368 
connectivity during trust decisions. These findings suggest a pivotal role of pTPJ connectivity 369 
in integration of behaviorally-relevant signal56. In our experiment, stronger integration of an 370 
honesty signal likely led to more positive beliefs about the other’s intentions, increasing one’s 371 
willingness to trust. Thus, the interplay between the VMPFC and left pTPJ likely represents a 372 
neural mechanism underlying integration of character information for behaviorally-relevant 373 
inferences on the other’s actions and intentions. 374 
Finally, we observed an honesty modulation of neural responses to value information in 375 
the OFC during outcome evaluations. Specifically, higher OFC activity was observed for 376 
positive outcomes received when interacting with honest others. These results suggest that in 377 
line with its role in processing subjective values of both social and nonsocial rewards57,58, higher 378 
neural activity in the OFC likely reflects an enhanced subjective value of nonsocial rewards 379 
induced by the positive character of the other. These neural findings might provide a 380 
mechanistic explanation to the positivity bias toward individuals with a good reputation that 381 
has been observed to influence learning processes24,25. Given the OFC role in learning 382 
mechanisms59,60, an asymmetry in the representation of positive and negative events associated 383 
with an individual of good social qualities in the OFC might promote stronger susceptibility to 384 
reputational priors and less flexibility in revising one’s beliefs about the other. Indeed, previous 385 
work has suggested that decreased activity in the OFC is associated with stronger resistance to 386 
political belief change during information encoding61. Hence, an asymmetric valuation of new 387 
incoming information likely contributes to judgmental biases and suboptimal learning. 388 
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Taken together, our results improve our understanding of how neural patterns 389 
representing honesty-based trustworthiness guide social behaviors in interpersonal interactions. 390 
The PCC and frontoparietal brain regions represent behaviorally-relevant knowledge about the 391 
other’s social character likely taking a role in the flexible revision of one’s current behavior for 392 
optimal adaptation to the other’s actions. Further, social behaviors such as trust are likely 393 
enacted based on integration of character information from the VMPFC into the pTPJ for 394 
reliable inferences on the good intentions of the partner. Finally, an asymmetric activity in the 395 
OFC in response to positive feedback due to the good reputation of the interacting partner likely 396 
jeopardizes an individual’s ability to optimally form and update one’s beliefs about the other, 397 
fostering a broad array of judgmental biases. Although we here showed that trustworthiness-398 
related neural signal successfully predicts individual trust decisions in a future social interaction, 399 
future studies are still needed to investigate in a brain-to-brain predictive framework whether 400 
these neural signatures of trustworthiness are also able to predict the neural patterns recruited 401 
by individual trust decisions. Further, future studies, especially in advice-taking paradigms, 402 
might also consider controlling for individual susceptibility to social influence, which might, 403 
for instance, explain an individual’s propensity to take advice from others. Another interesting 404 
research question for future studies relates to how other factors of trustworthiness impressions 405 
(like competence and benevolence) interact with honesty to elicit trust and/or distrust in others. 406 
By shedding light on how social characters are represented in the brain and influence individual 407 
decisions, this work makes an important contribution to the extant literature on human cognition 408 
in a broad range of scientific fields, such as neuroscience, social psychology, sociology, 409 
economics and political sciences. 410 
 411 
  412 
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Materials and Methods 413 
Subjects 414 
Thirty-one participants (20 females) participated in the experiment (age: 24.29±3.81 M±SD). 415 
Participants were recruited from the student community at the University. They were all right-416 
handed and had no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. Participants gave written 417 
informed consent after a complete description of the study was provided. All the procedures 418 
involved were in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the Ethical 419 
Committee of the University of Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany. 420 
 421 
Paradigms 422 
Take Advice Game. In the TAG, participants played as advisee a card game with eight different 423 
advisers in a randomized order. Participants were told that these advisers were other participants 424 
who were taking part in the same experiment and were preparing themselves in other rooms. 425 
Participants were told that roles in the game were randomly assigned by drawing a ball with 426 
their role from a lottery box and that all participants were going to do it prior to the experiment. 427 
They were told that for transparency reasons, the ball-drawing procedure was going to be 428 
performed in front of a camera on top of a screen where each participant could see each of the 429 
participants in the other rooms drawing their role. However, to guarantee anonymity, all 430 
cameras were mounted on top of the screen so that each participant was recorded only up to the 431 
chin. Camera adjustments were performed prior to the ball-drawing procedure to assure this. 432 
Moreover, to further guarantee anonymity, each participant needed to choose an avatar that 433 
represented themselves in the game (Fig. S1). In reality, participants received always the 434 
advisee role and the other videos were pre-recorded. 435 
As advisee, participants’ task was to draw the card with the higher number. Numbers on 436 
the cards ranged from 1 to 9 (except for 5). As participants did not have any information about 437 
the card numbers, they needed to rely exclusively on the adviser’s advice for their decisions 438 
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(establishing an adviser-advisee interdependency necessary for trust). Participants were told 439 
that the advisers could see only one of the two cards (adviser phase: 2-3s) and could 440 
communicate this information to them (advice phase: 1s). This implies that although advisers 441 
had more information than our participants, they did not know which card was the winning one, 442 
making this setting similar to real-life scenarios in which people generally ask for advice those 443 
who may know better, but advisers rarely have complete knowledge of life situations. 444 
Participants also knew that advisers could help them but did not have any benefits in doing so. 445 
However, both partners knew that after the TAG they were going to play a second game (i.e., 446 
the TG, see below), in which participants could repay the advisers for their honesty in advice 447 
giving. Thus, in the TAG, advisers were motivated to form a good reputation in the hope that 448 
participants would repay them later on. To note, however, participants did not promise or 449 
commit to repay the advisers for their advice. The dynamics set into motion by this design 450 
resembles real-life interactions in which honest behavior (e.g., giving good advice) has often 451 
no proximal benefits to an individual but may help her form a good reputation that might turn 452 
out advantageous in the future (a possible, distal benefit). 453 
Moreover, to disentangle trustworthiness information about the advisers from reward 454 
information about participants’ decisions, the advice of honest advisers was made unpredictive 455 
of the winning card (i.e., 50% of the time information about the losing card was given by the 456 
honest adviser). Thus, cards were drawn from a uniform distribution with pseudo-random 457 
sampling without replacement. The pseudo-random sampling procedure was optimized to have 458 
a realized probability of card drawing that approximates chance in both conditions, as would 459 
be expected in random drawing. A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirmed that the 460 
realized distributions of card numbers did not differ between advisers (K-S test = 0.25; p = .929). 461 
Participants then chose one of the two cards (decision phase: 1s) and saw a final feedback 462 
(feedback phase: 1s) in which they received both social information (the card numbers based 463 
on which they could infer the adviser’s trustworthiness) and nonsocial information (a green or 464 
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red circle representing winnings and losses, respectively). In each trial, participants could win 465 
or lose €1. Intertrial stimulus intervals (ISIs) were 2-8 (M = 2.6s) seconds long, whereas jitters 466 
between trials were 2-8 (M = 4s) seconds long. Participants played a total of 5 runs with 48 467 
trials each (24 with honest and 24 with dishonest advisers) for a total of 240 trials. 468 
Advice-taking behavior in the TAG was operationalized as the probability of choosing 469 
a card given the informativeness of the advice received. The optimal strategy in the game would 470 
be to choose more frequently a card when the adviser communicated that a number bigger than 471 
five is on that card but choose the other card when the adviser communicated that a number 472 
smaller than five is on that card. Moreover, as we manipulated the advisers’ honesty with the 473 
four honest advisers sending accurate information and the four dishonest advisers sending 474 
inaccurate information (with 100% contingency), we hypothesized that participants would 475 
employ the optimal card-choice strategy differently across honest and dishonest advisers. 476 
Analyses of card choice probabilities confirmed our hypotheses (Fig. S5). A repeated-measures 477 
ANOVA with card numbers as repeated measure yielded a significant main effect of card 478 
number (F(7,210) = 83.13; p < .0001; &'" = 0.74) with participants being more likely to choose a 479 
card when a number higher than five was said to be on the card and less likely to do so otherwise. 480 
Importantly, an interaction effect between card number and advisers was also found (F(7,210) = 481 
4.86; p < .0001; &'" = 0.14). To test the hypothesis that this interaction effect was due to the 482 
difference in trust in the advisers and was not simply driven by differences between specific 483 
cards, we ran post-hoc t-tests and compared the average choice probability for the honest and 484 
dishonest advisers for cards 1-4 and cards 6-9. Results indicate participants were less likely to 485 
choose a card when honest advisers told them a low number was on the card (honest vs. 486 
dishonest advisers for cards 1-4: t(30) = -2.97; p < 0.006) but more likely to choose a card when 487 
honest advisers told them a high number was on the card (honest vs. dishonest advisers for 488 
cards 6-9: t(30) = 2.88; p = 0.007). These results suggest that participants were discounting the 489 
advice of a dishonest adviser, likely because they did not believe it to be informative. In other 490 
HONESTY PREDICTS TRUST 
26 
 
words, this decrease in the likelihood of the use of the optimal strategy for dishonest advisers 491 
suggests a devaluation of their advice. Overall, these findings indicate that for the same piece 492 
of advice, the likelihood someone is going to take the advice hinges on their trust in the adviser 493 
or, complementary, on how much they value the adviser’s advice (i.e., recognize it as 494 
informative). 495 
 496 
Trust Game. After the scanning session, participants played as investor a one-shot TG with the 497 
same partners who advised them in the TAG. Participants were endowed with 10 monetary 498 
units (MUs) for each adviser in the role of trustee and decided whether they wanted to share 499 
any of this initial endowment with them (economic trust decision). They were told that any 500 
amount they decided to share would be tripled by the experimenter and passed on to the trustee 501 
who could in turn decide to share back any portion of this tripled amount (reciprocity decision). 502 
The TG was used to probe the transfer effect of the honest reputation established in the TAG 503 
on individual trust in a new social interaction. 504 
 505 
Exit questionnaire. To acquire an explicit measure of the criteria and motives behind 506 
participants’ behavior in the TAG, after the experiment, participants were asked to report 507 
whether they used any particular strategy and whether they thought this strategy was successful 508 
(binary answer option). Although a significant portion of participants reported that they used a 509 
strategy in the TAG (!" = 5.89; p = .015), except for 4 participants, no one believed it was 510 
successful (!" = 13.68; p = .0002). 511 
Moreover, they were also asked to describe the criteria for their decisions in the TAG 512 
(answering the question: “which strategy did you use for your choices in the first game?”). 513 
Three researchers blind to the study design and purposes categorized participants’ free answers. 514 
The first rater identified three main strategies. The second and third raters identified further 515 
subcategories for a total of seven and eight categories, respectively. These could be grouped 516 
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into the three main strategies of the first rater (averaged inter-rater reliability: r = .64). For each 517 
rater’s category, we estimated the percentage of participants using a particular strategy. We 518 
then averaged the percentage of participants using each strategy across raters. On average, 519 
participants made their decisions 1) intuitively (M = 11.8%: rater 1: 9.7%; rater 2: 16%; rater 520 
3: 9.7%), 2) based on the advisers’ trustworthiness (M = 55.9%: rater 1: 54.8%; rater 2: 51.6%; 521 
rater 3: 61.3%), or 3) on the advisers’ advice (M = 32.3%: rater 1: 35.5%; rater 2: 32.3%; rater 522 
3: 29%). Thus, the majority of our participants (88.2%) explicitly reported to have made their 523 
decisions in the TAG based on the adviser’s trustworthiness character and advice. 524 
 525 
Scanning parameters and preprocessing 526 
Image acquisition. Data were collected with a Siemens MAGNETOM TRIO 3 Tesla scanner 527 
at the Freie Universität Berlin. The fMRI scans consisted of an average of 360 contiguous 528 
volumes per run (axial slices, 37; slice thickness, 3 mm; interslice gap, 0.6 mm; TR, 2000 ms; 529 
TE, 30 ms; flip angle, 70°; voxel size, 3.0×3.0×3.0 mm3; FOV, 192×192 mm2). High-resolution 530 
structural images were acquired through a 3D sagittal T1-weighted MP-RAGE (sagittal slices, 531 
176; TR, 1900 ms; TE, 2.52 ms; slice thickness, 1.0 mm; voxel size, 1.0×1.0×1.0 mm3; flip 532 
angle, 9°; inversion time, 900 ms; FOV, 256×256 mm2). 533 
 534 
Image preprocessing. Neuroimaging data analyses were performed on SPM12 (v. 6905; 535 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm12/) in MATLAB 2016b (The Mathworks, Natick, 536 
Massachusetts; http://www.mathworks.com/). The functional images were slice-timing corrected, 537 
corrected for voxel displacement using field maps and realigned for head movement correction 538 
to the mean image. Using the unified segmentation procedure62, functional images were co-539 
registered to their structural images and subsequently normalized into MNI space using 540 
deformation fields (resampling voxel size: 2×2×2 mm3). Finally, functional images used for 541 
univariate analyses were spatially smoothed using a Gaussian filter (8×8×8 mm3 full width at 542 
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half maximum, FWHM) to decrease spatial noise. Movement outliers were identified and 543 
excluded if head movements/translations were above 3 mm/rad. One run of two participants 544 
met these criteria and was therefore excluded from all analyses. 545 
 546 
Analyses 547 
Behavioral Analyses. Differences in advice-taking behaviors between honest and dishonest 548 
advisers were tested with a one-sample t-test. A generalized mixed-effects logistic regression 549 
was implemented to investigated whether trial-by-trial advice-taking behavior was predicted by 550 
the adviser’s honesty irrespective of the benefits associated with the act of trust. A model with 551 
the following four regressors was built to predict trust in the adviser’s advice (1=trust; 552 
0=distrust): one regressor coding for the adviser’s honesty, one for the advised card, one for the 553 
advised number, and one for the feedback in the previous trial played with the current adviser. 554 
Random-effects structure was based on a ‘maximal’ approach with by-subject and by-item 555 
random intercepts and slopes63. P-values were computed with a likelihood-ratio test by 556 
comparing the full model with the same model without the fixed effect of interest but that it is 557 
otherwise identical in random-effects structure63. A mixed-effects regression was further fitted 558 
to the difference of advice-taking behaviors toward honest and dishonest advisers with run as 559 
fixed-effects timing variable and subject as random intercept to test the increase of trust 560 
difference over time. Two similar mixed-effects regression models were then separately fitted 561 
to each advice-taking behavior toward honest and dishonest advisers in order to examine 562 
increases/decreases of trust in the two advisers over time. To test whether trustworthiness 563 
relates to subsequent economic trust decisions in a different social context, advice-taking 564 
behavior in the TAG was correlated with the amount of money invested in the TG. To further 565 
probe that trust decisions in the TG followed from one’s perceptions about the other’s 566 
trustworthiness in the TAG and were not simply reflecting a repaying behavior, correlation 567 
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analyses (Spearman correlations) were performed between gains in the TAG and money 568 
invested in the TG. 569 
 570 
Univariate and ROI Analyses. Two general linear models (GLMs) with eight regressors of 571 
interest (two for each task phase) on the first level were defined for both univariate and 572 
multivariate analyses of fMRI data to be able to estimate beta parameters that uniquely capture 573 
neural signals related to trustworthiness and value encoding, respectively. GLM1 consisted of 574 
the following regressors: 2 regressors for the advisor phase, 2 regressors for the advice phase, 575 
2 regressors for the decision phase and 2 regressors for the feedback phase coding the adviser’s 576 
trustworthiness (honesty/dishonesty). GLM2 entailed the same regressors as GLM1 with the 577 
exception that the 2 regressors for the feedback phase coded value information (gain/loss). 578 
Control analyses were performed to check that the neural signatures of trustworthiness were 579 
not confounded by other factors. In particular, we re-ran GLM1 adding further regressors and 580 
parametric modulators to account for variance that might be due to risk and congruency effects. 581 
To control for risk, two orthogonal parametric modulators were added to the two regressors 582 
coding honesty and dishonesty in the feedback phase; namely, a 1st order term for reward 583 
probability given the adviser’s advice and a 2nd order term for reward variance (i.e., the mean 584 
squared deviation from expected outcome), which is quadratic in reward probability p and refers 585 
to the expected risk given the adviser’s advice64. Second, to control for contingency effects (i.e., 586 
informational deviance between the adviser’s advice and the actual card number on the advised 587 
card), we added a regressor coding for all feedback phases (i.e., across advisers) with duration 588 
1s and degrees of congruency (continuous variable) as parametric modulator. 589 
Finally, to separately investigate brain activations for responses to positive and negative 590 
feedback when interacting with honest and dishonest advisers, and to analyze the honesty 591 
modulation of brain regions processing feedback information, GLM3 was defined 592 
encompassing a total of 10 regressors of interest. All task phases had the same regressors as 593 
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GLM1 and GLM2, except for the feedback phase, for which 4 regressors were defined coding 594 
winnings and losses received when advised by honest and dishonest advisers, separately. In all 595 
GLMs, conditions were modeled as events using a stick function (i.e., setting the duration of 596 
each condition to 0). 597 
Motion parameters were further included as regressors of no-interest in all GLMs. A 598 
temporal high-pass filter with a cutoff of 128 seconds was applied for all GLMs. Results were 599 
whole-brain corrected for multiple comparison using a voxel-level threshold of p < .001 and a 600 
family-wise error, cluster-level (FWEc) corrected threshold of p < .0565. The ROI analysis for 601 
the OFC (area s32) to post-hoc examine the honesty modulation of positive outcomes was based 602 
on the probabilistic map provided by the SPM Anatomy toolbox, v. 2.266. 603 
 604 
Multivariate voxel pattern analyses. Decoding analyses to investigate the neural representations 605 
of trustworthiness (honesty/dishonesty) and value (winnings/losses) information were 606 
performed using a linear support vector machine (SVM) algorithm for binary classification and 607 
a whole-brain searchlight approach with a searchlight’s radius size of 10mm. Applying a leave-608 
one-run-out cross-validation (LOROCV), the SVM was trained on all but one run and tested on 609 
the left-out run. This procedure was repeated n times with n=5 (total number of runs) and the 610 
algorithm’s cross-validated accuracy was computed. To decode character information related 611 
to the advisers’ trustworthiness, beta images from the feedback phase of GLM1 (fitted to 612 
unsmoothed, normalized brain images) were used. To decode feedback information related to 613 
winnings and losses, beta images from the feedback phase of GLM2 (fitted to unsmoothed, 614 
normalized brain images) were used. Searchlight decoding analyses were applied to all voxels 615 
within the whole-brain gray matter probability mask provided by SPM and thresholded at 0.1. 616 
Decoding generalization of the trustworthiness and value decoding networks was tested 617 
with a classification analysis using a leave-one-subject-out cross-validation (LOSOCV) 618 
approach in which the SVM was trained on z-scored average beta images of all but one 619 
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participant and tested on the left-out participant. Cross-validated accuracy of the group-level 620 
classification was tested for significance running a permutation test with 10,000 permutations 621 
(n_perm). In each permutation, the SVM was trained on randomly permuted labels using the 622 
same LOSOCV approach of the true classification model. The sum of models trained on 623 
permuted labels that performed better than the true model was then computed (p_models). The 624 
nonparametric p value was assessed including the observed statistics according to the following 625 
formula67: (1 + +_-./012) (1 + 4_+05-)6 . Multivariate prediction analyses to predict 626 
subsequent, economic trust decisions in the TG from the trustworthiness and value decoding 627 
networks were based on the same LOSOCV procedure and permutation test but used support 628 
vector regression (SVR) for prediction of continuous variables. 629 
Decoding analyses were run using The Decoding Toolbox TDT, v. 3.9968 and custom 630 
MATLAB scripts. 631 
 632 
Meta-analytic functional decoding. To characterize the functional specification of the 633 
trustworthiness decoding network, a meta-analytic image decoding analysis was performed 634 
using the Neurosynth Image Decoder (neurosynth.org)29. The Neurosynth Image Decoder 635 
allows to quantitatively estimate the representational similarity between any task-based 636 
activation pattern and meta-analytical activation patterns associated with particular terms and 637 
generated based on brain images in the Neurosynth database69. Similarity was computed as 638 
Pearson’s correlations across all voxels between the task-based and the meta-analytical maps. 639 
We selected meta-analytic maps based on 12 different terms to test the specific a priori 640 
hypothesis that the trustworthiness decoding map more likely related to functional roles in the 641 
social domain as opposed to the reward, risk and congruency domains. It has to be noted that 642 
the observed correlations are relatively small but in line with previous research70. Moreover, 643 
while the analysis is quantitative, the conclusions that can be drawn are descriptive in nature, 644 
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as there is no inference statistics that tested whether any of the observed correlation coefficients 645 
is significantly higher than the others. 646 
 647 
Task-dependent functional connectivity analyses. To test the information flow between the 648 
VMPFC underlying honesty signals and any regions across the whole brain, a task-dependent 649 
functional connectivity analysis was implemented using a whole-brain psychophysiological 650 
interaction analysis (PPI71 with seed region (10mm radius) around the VMPFC peak 651 
coordinates yielded by the univariate contrast. The PPI-GLM consisted of a task regressor, a 652 
physiological regressor entailing deconvolved blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal 653 
from the seed region and a regressor for the interaction term with movement parameters as 654 
regressors of no interest. Significant connectivity was assessed with a voxel-level threshold of 655 
p < .001 and an FWE cluster-level threshold of p < .05 within the ROI72. 656 
 657 
Labeling and data visualization. The SPM Anatomy toolbox v. 2.266 and MRIcron 658 
(http://people.cas.sc.edu/rorden/mricron/install.html/) were used for anatomical labeling. 659 
MRIcroGL (https://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricrogl/home/) was used for brain 660 
visualizations. 661 
  662 
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Fig. S1. Timeline of the Take Advice Game. 
Timeline of the Take Advice Game (TAG) in the MRI scanner. Before the task, participants had to choose an 
avatar that represented their identity in the game. They were told that the advisers did the same. Through these 
avatars, it was assured on one hand that participants knew in each trial who advised them and, on the other, 
anonymity was guaranteed to each participant. In the adviser presentation phase, participants were told that they 
see the adviser they were matched with in that trial. In this phase, the adviser was given information about one 
of the two cards that he or she could communicate to the participants. Thus, in the adviser phase, participants 
had just to wait that the adviser sends her/his advice. To introduce human-like decisional variability in the 
communication of the advice, the advice was randomly presented between 2 and 3 seconds after adviser 
presentation. The advice (presentation time: 1s) was a number between 1 and 9 (expect for 5) either next to the 
right or the left card. After a variable ISI (range: 2-8s, mean: 2.6s), the two cards were presented one more time 
and participants were prompted to pick one of the two cards (1s). After another variable ISI, feedback was 
presented for 1s, revealing the numbers on the cards, based on which participants could judge the honesty of 
the adviser (social information), and a red or green circle between the cards, representing the participant’s 
performance (nonsocial information about one’s payoffs). Finally, an ITI (range: 2-8s, mean: 4s) showing a 
fixation cross was presented at the end of the trial. 
ISI, interstimulus interval; ITI, intertrial interval. 
  
  
Fig. S2. Control GLM analysis. 
Comparison of GLM1 coding for honesty and dishonesty (red), and the control GLM that further controlled for 
risk and congruency effects (green). The two GLMs yielded similar results. In yellow are the overlaps depicted. 






Fig. S3. Meta-analytic functional decoding analysis. 
To test the functional specificity of the trustworthiness decoding network, we performed a meta-analytic 
functional decoding analysis. Using the Neurosynth database, we evaluated the representational similarity 
between the neural patterns of our trustworthiness map and meta-analytic neural patterns associated with 
specific terms in the fMRI literature. This way, it was possible to characterize the functional role of our neural 
patterns by a quantitative comparison with previously observed neural patterns associated with certain cognitive 
functions. We selected twelve different terms in the social, value, risk and congruency domain. Results show 
that the neural signatures of the trustworthiness decoding network reveal stronger similarity with neural patterns 
associated with mentalizing, judgments, social cognition and social interactions than with other cognitive 





Fig. S4. Model-based predictions of economic trust decisions. 
To test whether neural signatures of trustworthiness predict individual trusting behavior, multivariate regression 
analyses were performed with neural signal from the trustworthiness decoding map (A) and the value decoding 
map (B) to predict averaged individual trust in the trust game. Depicted in blue is the individual observed trust, 
in orange the predicted trust. Black lines connecting blue and orange dots represent model’s prediction errors 




Fig. S5. Card-choice probability analysis. 
Advice-taking behavior in the take advice game (TAG) was operationalized as the probability of choosing a 
card given the informativeness of the advice received. The optimal strategy in the game would be to choose 
more frequently a card when the adviser communicated that a number bigger than five is on that card but choose 
the other card when the adviser communicated that a number smaller than five is on that card. Moreover, as we 
manipulated the advisers’ honesty, participants should have employed the optimal card-choice strategy 
differently for honest and dishonest advisers. In particular, they should have used this strategy more loosely for 
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Trust is central to bonding and cooperation. In many situations, individuals need to trust others 32 
based exclusively on subjective, first impressions of the other’s trustworthiness. Previous 33 
studies have shown that trusting behaviors elicit activations in dopaminergic brain regions and 34 
that subjective impressions of others can be formed from social information from faces (e.g., 35 
facial trustworthiness and attractiveness). However, the effects of dopamine agonists on trusting 36 
behaviors based on others’ facial trustworthiness are yet unknown. Using a double-blind, 37 
placebo-controlled, within-subject design, we here administrated pramipexole (a D2/D3 38 
dopamine agonist) to 28 healthy female participants before playing a one-shot trust game in the 39 
role of investor. To induce different trusting behaviors, facial trustworthiness of the partners’ 40 
face was manipulated with minimal variations in facial attractiveness. Our results show that by 41 
minimizing attractiveness information in faces, it is possible to isolate the contribution of facial 42 
trustworthiness to behavioral trust. Notably, even though pramipexole did not alter participants’ 43 
trustworthiness impressions, trusting behavior was significantly impacted by pramipexole 44 
intake. Importantly, these pramipexole’s effects on impression-based trust were mediated by 45 
hormonal contraceptive use. In particular, trust increased in women using hormonal 46 
contraceptive but decreased in non-users after pramipexole intake. This study fills an important 47 
gap in the experimental literature on trust and its underlying neural mechanisms, pointing to 48 
peculiar cognitive and neural dynamics underlying trusting behaviors based on subjective, 49 
trustworthiness impressions. 50 





































































Trust and trustworthiness are key features of interpersonal social interactions, as they foster 53 
cooperation and facilitate binding and social integration [1,2]. Research on trust has so far 54 
provided increasing evidence that trusting behaviors rely on two cognitive mechanisms. On one 55 
hand, individuals ground their trust decisions in subjective impressions about the partner’s 56 
trustworthiness that are formed rapidly and effortlessly [3]. On the other hand, trust can be 57 
rooted in dynamically updated beliefs about the partner’s trustworthiness based on previous 58 
experience with the partner during repeated social interactions [4]. 59 
Previous neuroimaging studies have indicated that both impression- and experience-60 
based trust activate dopaminergic brain regions such as the striatum and medial prefrontal 61 
cortex [1,5,6]. However, it is an open question whether the engagement of dopamine plays a 62 
key role in trust as such, or it rather reflects other cognitive mechanisms laterally associated 63 
with trusting behavior. In repeated trusting interactions (e.g., in the multi-round trust game, 64 
TG), previous work has indicated a time-dependent shift in the neural patterns underlying 65 
experience-based trust with higher-order brain regions mainly engaged at the beginning of a 66 
social exchange and dopaminergic brain structures recruited in later stages [1,7]. These results 67 
indicate that the engagement of dopaminergic brain regions in experience-based trust might 68 
reflect reinforcement learning mechanisms related to belief update about the other’s social 69 
character, which has recently been suggested also by meta-analyses on trusting behaviors in 70 
single and repeated interactions [8,9]. 71 
Similarly, the role of dopamine in impression-based trust is yet to be clarified. Previous 72 
studies on subjective impressions about others’ trustworthiness have largely focused on 73 
impressions formed from faces [10]. However, faces entail other types of social information 74 
than facial trustworthiness, such as facial attractiveness, which not only guides trusting 75 




































































attractiveness is closely related to facial trustworthiness and, to our knowledge, has not properly 77 
controlled for in previous research [10,16,17], the observed neural responses underlying 78 
impression-based trust in dopaminergic regions might be as likely evoked by facial 79 
trustworthiness as by facial attractiveness. 80 
Thus, given that the engagement of dopaminergic brain structures in repeated trusting 81 
interactions might be related to reward anticipation or reinforcement learning processes [13,18] 82 
and that the role of dopamine in trust based on facial trustworthiness impressions might be 83 
confounded by other types of social information from faces [11,12], the link between trust and 84 
the dopaminergic system remains to date an open question. 85 
In this study with a double-blind, within-subject, placebo-controlled design, we 86 
investigated for the first time whether administration of a dopamine agonist (DA, i.e., 87 
pramipexole) impacts impression-based trust. To limit as much as possible the engagement of 88 
other cognitive mechanisms during trust, participants played in the role of investor the one-shot 89 
TG and their trust was manipulated by presentation of faces that varied in their facial 90 
trustworthiness. As impressions of facial trustworthiness are not affected by dopaminergic 91 
modulation [19], we expected that our pharmacological intervention would not impact 92 
subjective trustworthiness impressions. Thus, we assumed that our manipulation of behavioral 93 
trust would not be confounded by possible effects of pramipexole on trustworthiness 94 
impressions. Moreover, we employed the one-shot TG, because it reliably induces impression-95 
based trusting behaviors that are not confounded by learning mechanisms, as participants in the 96 
one-shot TG interact only once with their trustees without feedback information about the 97 
trustees’ behavior. Further, to minimize facial attractiveness confounds, we chose faces that 98 
maximally differed on the trustworthiness dimension with minimal variations on the 99 
attractiveness one. 100 
Pramipexole, a D2/D3 DA preferentially targeting brain areas in the striatum and medial 101 




































































and given the fact that those target brain regions coincide with trust-related brain areas, 103 
pramipexole is a good candidate to study pharmacologically-induced variations of behavioral 104 
trust. Further, given sex differences in the dopaminergic system and its pharmacological 105 
modulation [22-25], we recruited only female participants. Finally, as social behaviors have 106 
previously been shown to differ as a function of hormonal contraceptive use in women [26,27], 107 
we also assessed the hormonal contraceptive use in our female sample. 108 
 109 
Materials and Methods 110 
Subjects. Thirty participants took part in the experiment. Due to technical problems in data 111 
collection, 2 participants had to be excluded leaving a final sample of 28 healthy, female 112 
subjects (22.11±2.25 years, mean±SD). All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 113 
The study was approved by the local Medical Ethics Committee of the University of Lübeck. 114 
All subjects provided written consent for participation. We recruited only female participants, 115 
due to previous research showing sex differences in dopamine function [22], receptor 116 
availability [25] and modulation by pharmacological intervention [23,24]. Fifteen of our 117 
participants used hormonal contraceptives (53.4% of our sample). In line with studies showing 118 
that the dopaminergic system is modulated by the estrous cycle, this information was entered 119 
as regressor into each regression model [28,29]. The testing time of day was held constant (1 120 
p.m.) across sessions for each participant, to control for circadian variability in hormone release 121 
[30]. 122 
 123 
Experimental procedure. Subjects were invited to the lab on two different days with a gap of at 124 
least one and maximum of two weeks to participate in a double-blind, within-subject 125 
experiment. This gap was scheduled to allow for the dopamine wash-out phase. Upon arrival, 126 




































































counteract the common nausea effects following pramipexole administration, the drug/placebo 128 
intake was accompanied by 10 mg domperidon. Three hours after drug/placebo administration 129 
[20,21], participants underwent a functional MRI session to test DA effects on neural dynamics 130 
[31]. After the MRI session, participants underwent a battery of tasks at a lab computer, among 131 
which there was the one-shot TG (Fig. 1A). 132 
............................................................................................................................................. 133 
Insert Figure 1 about here 134 
............................................................................................................................................. 135 
 136 
On both sessions, subjects performed multiple rounds of the one-shot TG in the role of 137 
investor (each round with a different trustee). In each trial, participants were first presented with 138 
a picture of a trustee and decided how much they wanted to share with the depicted person on 139 
a scale from 0 (sharing nothing) to 10 monetary units (sharing the entire initial endowment) 140 
(Fig. 1B). Participants were informed that each monetary unit (MU) corresponded to 30 Cents 141 
and that thus the total amount of money they were endowed with was 3€. Further, they were 142 
told that every shared amount of money would be tripled, and the trustee had to decide whether 143 
to share any portion of the tripled amount of money back. After the TG, participants rated the 144 
trustworthiness (Fig. 1C) and attractiveness (Fig. 1D) of each face on a 7-point Likert-scale. 145 
Attractiveness and trustworthiness ratings were randomly presented in two separate blocks. 146 
Experimental procedures on the first and second session were exactly the same. Stimuli 147 
were presented using Psychtoolbox 3 (http://psychtoolbox.org) on MALTAB 2016b 148 
(https://www.mathworks.com). 149 
 150 
Stimulus Material. Trustees’ pictures were selected from a dataset of 98 different pictures of 151 
faces from participants who participated in previous experiments of the lab and gave written 152 




































































on-line survey for attractiveness (1 = really unattractive; 7 = really attractive), trustworthiness 154 
(1 = really untrustworthy; 7 = really trustworthy) and facial expression (-3 = negative; 3 = 155 
positive) on a 7-point Likert-scale by an independent sample (N = 60, 38 females). All faces of 156 
the dataset had an emotionally neutral expression (-0.02±0.7). Of all pictures, 12 (6 female) 157 
were selected that did not significantly differ on the attractiveness dimension (F(2,9) = 1.53; p 158 
= .268), but varied maximally on the trustworthiness dimension (F(2,9) = 85.04; p < .0001). We 159 
categorized the stimuli in three different categories according to the rating: untrustworthy 160 
(3.27±0.16), trustworthy (5.0±0.27) and average trustworthy (4.05±0.10). We confirmed that 161 
each of these trustworthiness categories differed significantly from the other (trustworthy vs. 162 
untrustworthy: t(1,3) = 10.69, p = .0018; trustworthy vs. average trustworthy: t(1,3) = 8.22, p = 163 
.0038; averaged trustworthy vs. untrustworthy: t(1,3) = 10.61, p = .0018). 164 
 165 
Analyses. We fitted generalized mixed-effects regression models to the three dependent 166 
variables under examination, namely, 1) trusting behavior in the one-shot TG, 2) 167 
trustworthiness and 3) attractiveness evaluations of faces, which were collected to check that 168 
our manipulation of facial trustworthiness perceptions was successful and independent of facial 169 
attractiveness perceptions. The best model was selected among a series of models that vary in 170 
their complexity from the simplest model testable given our design and with no interaction 171 
effects to increasingly complex models with more interaction effects. The simplest model was 172 
a model containing five fixed-effects regressors, namely, a dummy variable coding for 173 
treatment (P, pramipexole/placebo), trustworthiness dimensions (Tr, trustworthy faces, average 174 
faces and untrustworthy faces), gender of pictures’ faces (G, male/female), a dummy variable 175 
coding for hormonal contraceptive use (HC, contraceptive users/non-users) and a regressor 176 
coding for session order (Sess, first/second session). In each model, random-effects structure 177 
was kept maximal with by-subject random intercepts and slopes for each main effect and 178 




































































added for the trustworthiness dimensions and gender of pictures to account for the non-180 
independence due to the repeated presentation of these categories across observations [33]. 181 
This way, we ended up with a total of 18 mixed-effects regression models that were 182 
separately applied to each dependent variable of this study, i.e., trusting behavior in the TG, 183 
trustworthiness rating and attractiveness ratings (Tab. S1). Model selection was based on a 184 
model comparison approach using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), which estimates the 185 
goodness of fit of a model based on its likelihood and complexity (by penalizing for the number 186 
of parameters to estimate). As expected, different models were best explaining participants’ 187 
behavior and subjective impressions. The winning model for trusting behavior (T) was a model 188 
with one interaction effect between treatment and hormonal contraceptive use, as follows: 189 
 190 
𝑇𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐻𝐶𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑆𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑃 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝑡.  (1) 191 
 192 
The winning model for trustworthiness impressions (TI) was a model with one 193 
interaction effect between gender and trustworthiness dimensions, as follows: 194 
 195 
𝑇𝐼𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐻𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐺 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑡.  (2) 196 
 197 
Finally, the winning model for attractiveness impressions (AI) was a model with one 198 
interaction effect between hormonal contraceptive use and trustworthiness dimensions, as 199 
follows: 200 
 201 
𝐴𝐼𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐻𝐶𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑆𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐻𝐶 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑡.  (3) 202 
 203 
To test the degree to which trustworthiness information influenced participants’ trust 204 




































































the individual level with mean trustworthiness and attractiveness ratings as predictor of average 206 
trust in the TG. All analyses were run in MATLAB 2016b. For mixed-effects regression models, 207 
the function fitglme was used. For linear regression models the function fitlm was used. 208 
 209 
Results 210 
Subjective impressions impact on trusting behavior. Results from the TG show that participants, 211 
in the role of investor, trusted their partners based on subjective impressions about the partner 212 
formed on the basis of the partner’s facial trustworthiness. Thus, trustworthy-looking trustees 213 
were entrusted with more money in the TG (𝛽  = 0.60, standard error (SE) = 0.13, 95% 214 
confidence interval (CI) = [0.35, 0.85], p < .00001; Fig. 2A & Tab. S2). Further, participants’ 215 
trustworthiness perceptions were also significantly different between male and female trustees 216 
(𝛽 = 0.34, SE = 0.13, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.60], p = .013; Tab. S3). In particular, trustworthy-217 
looking females were perceived as more trustworthy than males, while untrustworthy-looking 218 
males were perceived as more trustworthy than females (Fig. 3A). On the contrary, even though 219 
females were perceived as slightly more attractive than males (𝛽 = 0.30, SE = 0.15, 95% CI = 220 
[0.008, 0.60], p = .044; Tab. S4), attractiveness perceptions did not differ across trustworthiness 221 
dimensions (𝛽 = -0.02, SE = 0.13, 95% CI = [-0.27, 0.24], p = .904; Tab. S4), thereby validating 222 
our stimulus material (Fig. 2B-C & Fig. 3B). Finally, an individual regression analysis with 223 
both trustworthiness and attractiveness as predictors revealed that trustworthiness significantly 224 
predicted trust (𝛽 = 1.85, SE = 0.71, 95% CI = [0.39, 3.31], p = .015), but not attractiveness (𝛽 225 
= 0.99, SE = 0.70, 95% CI = [-0.45, 2.42], p = .170). These results suggest that in single 226 
interactions, trusting behaviors can be guided exclusively by subjective impressions about the 227 
other’s trustworthiness independently of other social information, such as facial attractiveness. 228 
............................................................................................................................................. 229 






































































Pramipexole modulation of trusting behavior. Further, pramipexole administration appeared to 233 
influence behavioral trust (Fig. 4A). In particular, we observed reduced trusting behavior in the 234 
pramipexole session compared to the placebo session (𝛽 = -0.98, SE = 0.38, 95% CI = [-1.74, 235 
-0.23], p = .010; Tab. S2), that is, participants entrusted overall less money with their partners 236 
after pramipexole administration. Interestingly, this decrease in trusting behavior after 237 
pramipexole administration was not reflected by any modulation of subjective impressions 238 
about the partner’s trustworthiness (𝛽 = -0.13, SE = 0.10, 95% CI = [-0.32, 0.06], p = .175; 239 
Tab. S3) or attractiveness (𝛽 = -0.006, SE = 0.12, 95% CI = [-0.23, 0.22], p = .959; Tab. S4). 240 
Notably, this modulation of trusting behavior was mediated by hormonal contraceptive use (𝛽 241 
= 1.32, SE = 0.49, 95% CI = [0.36, 2.29], p = .007; Tab. S2). In particular, pramipexole 242 
increased trusting behavior in participants who used hormonal contraceptives, whereas it 243 
decreased trusting behavior in those who did not (Fig. 4B). No contraceptive use effects were 244 
found for subjective impressions about the partner’s trustworthiness (𝛽 = -0.002, SE = 0.16, 245 
95% CI = [-0.32, 0.31], p = .990; Tab. S3). On the contrary, we observed an effect of 246 
contraceptive use on subjective attractiveness impressions, which interacted with facial 247 
trustworthiness dimensions (𝛽 = 0.34, SE = 0.16, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.66], p = .038; Tab. S4). In 248 
particular, trustworthy-looking partners were perceived as more attractive by participants who 249 
used hormonal contraceptives (Fig. 5). These results indicate a complex interaction between 250 
the dopaminergic system and trusting behavior that is modulated by widely used common 251 
contraceptive methods in females. 252 
............................................................................................................................................. 253 







































































In this study, we investigated for the first time the DA effects on behavioral trust. We first 258 
isolated the contribution of trustworthiness impressions on trusting behavior. We then observed 259 
how pharmacological modulation of a DA (i.e., pramipexole) impacts impression-based trust. 260 
In particular, administration of pramipexole decreased trust in unknown others. Notably, this 261 
decrease of trust was particularly prominent in women who did not use hormonal contraceptives. 262 
On the contrary, in contraceptive users, pramipexole intake increased trust in unknown others. 263 
We first replicated previous findings that sensitivity to facial trustworthiness is not 264 
affected by dopamine modulation. In particular, a previous study has shown that dopamine 265 
depletion does not alter trustworthiness perceptions of others despite successful neural 266 
modulation of the brain’s reward system [19]. Analogously, although we previously reported 267 
that pramipexole successfully modulated neural activity in dopaminergic brain regions in the 268 
same sample [31], no significant modulations of facial trustworthiness were observed after 269 
pramipexole administration. Hence, results from both our and previous studies suggest that 270 
other neural dynamics and brain regions than dopaminergic areas likely underlie first subjective 271 
impressions of others’ social character. 272 
Moreover, we disentangled for the first time the contribution of trustworthiness 273 
information to trusting behavior from attractiveness evaluations. In particular, our results 274 
suggest that by reducing attractiveness information in faces, it is possible to isolate the influence 275 
of facial trustworthiness on trust. An interesting hypothesis for future studies would be to 276 
investigate whether different types of social information from faces make individuals trust 277 
others for different motives. For instance, trustworthy-looking individuals may be trusted 278 
because they are likely to be good cooperators [34], whereas, attractive others may be trusted 279 




































































ability to form impressions about the other’s social character (e.g., trustworthiness) to infer their 281 
cooperative intentions and overcome betrayal aversion [36-38]. 282 
Finally, our results indicate a successful impact of pramipexole on impression-based 283 
trust. In particular, pramipexole reduced trust in unknown others in female participants who did 284 
not use hormonal contraceptives. Consistently with the absence of any DA impact on 285 
trustworthiness impressions, such effects on trust were observed across facial trustworthiness 286 
dimensions. The underlying dynamics of these DA effects on trust may be multiple. The 287 
decrease of impression-based trust following pramipexole administration may be due to the 288 
effects of pramipexole as DA on dopaminergic brain structures. Such DA effects may reduce 289 
participants’ sensitivity to social contact and feedback. Dopamine has previously shown to 290 
mediate socially-relevant behaviors such as approach strategies and mate preferences [39-41]. 291 
As trust signals the willingness to establish a potentially long-lasting relationship advantageous 292 
for future cooperation [2,42,43], administration of a DA drug might saturate the human need to 293 
belong, limiting one’s willingness to relate to and connect with others [44]. 294 
However, the same decrease of impression-based trust may be explained by a dopamine 295 
antagonist effect of pramipexole as well. In particular, pramipexole acts on both D2 and D3 296 
autoreceptors [20,21,45-47]. D3 autoreceptor activation has been observed to inhibit the 297 
reward-related phasic firing of dopaminergic neurons [48]. Such inhibition of dopamine activity 298 
has further been hypothesized to be reflected by reduced functional MRI activations in brain 299 
structures rich in D3 autoreceptors [21]. A dopamine antagonist effect on dopaminergic brain 300 
structures might also have a negative impact on trust. For instance, mental diseases attributed 301 
to dopamine dysfunction are characterized by social impairments and social avoidance [49-51]. 302 
Hence, pramipexole administration might have silenced the ability to form and maintain 303 
satisfying social relationships, reducing an individual’s willingness to trust. 304 
Importantly, the effects of pramipexole administration on trust in women using 305 




































































in unknown others in female participants who used hormonal contraceptives at the time of the 307 
study. Previous work has shown that hormonal contraceptive use alters both neural dynamics 308 
and behavior in women. Neuroimaging studies have provided preliminary evidence of altered 309 
neural reward processing [52] and differing functional connectivity in higher-order brain areas 310 
pivotal to social cognition [53] in women using hormonal contraception as compared to 311 
naturally cycling women. Behavioral studies have pinpointed differences in women using 312 
hormonal contraceptives in mate-choice behaviors and attraction to other-sex features, such as 313 
male face, voice and odor [27,54,55]. Notably, contraceptive use contributes to romantic 314 
relationship outcome, with important implications for personal satisfaction and quality of life 315 
[56]. 316 
In particular, contraceptive use has been observed to shift women’s mating preferences 317 
to less masculine features (indicative of low testosterone levels), so that women using hormonal 318 
contraceptive prioritize traits such as wealth and intelligence in mate choice [57,58]. Since 319 
contraceptive use enhances preferences for safety and future security, women using hormonal 320 
contraceptive might also exhibit stronger attraction to trustworthy partners. Indeed, in our 321 
sample, women using hormonal contraceptive perceived trustworthy faces as more attractive, 322 
although facial attractiveness was manipulated to be comparable across trustworthiness 323 
dimensions. Pramipexole administration might hence boost such preferences in women using 324 
hormonal contraceptive, leading to a more pronounced trusting behavior. 325 
A couple of limitations have to be addressed. First, due to gender differences in 326 
pharmacological interventions using dopamine drugs [23,24], we tried to avoid gender 327 
variability in the DA effects on trust by limiting our sample to female participants. However, 328 
this choice reduces the generalizability of our results. Thus, future studies need to replicate our 329 
results in a bigger and more heterogenous sample. Second, interpretation of our results is limited 330 
by the absence of data on contraceptive type used by our female sample. Different types of 331 




































































brain dynamics [53]. Hence, future studies are needed to replicate our findings controlling for 333 
variables that might confound a pharmacological intervention. Third, a previous study has 334 
found weak, but significant evidence on the effects of endogenous sex hormones on 335 
interpersonal trust during the preovulatory phase in a sample of 12 naturally cycling women 336 
[30]. As we could not control in this study for menstrual cycle phases, future studies are needed 337 
to check whether our results hold also after controlling for sex hormones in naturally cycling 338 
women. Finally, the use of more suitable techniques such as positron emission tomography 339 
might help provide better insights into the neural relationships between dopamine and trust, for 340 
instance, by further collecting data on the binding profile of the administrated drug. 341 
In conclusion, we provided first pharmacological evidence on the effects of a DA drug 342 
on impression-based trust. By controlling for variables that may have confounded results of 343 
previous studies, we demonstrated that facial trustworthiness uniquely affects trusting behavior 344 
and that pramipexole alters behavioral trust across facial trustworthiness dimensions with no 345 
impact on subjective, trustworthiness impressions. Notably, DA effects on trust were mediated 346 
by hormonal contraceptive use. This finding indicates complex neural dynamics underpinning 347 
social behaviors, which likely involve the interplay of different neuromodulators and brain 348 
systems. Thus, these findings importantly contribute to fill an epistemological gap in the current 349 
literature, potentially directing the current research toward a new path of investigations aiming 350 
at unearthing the complex cognitive and neural dynamics that bring about social behaviors. 351 
 352 
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Captions to Figures 368 
 369 
Fig. 1. Procedures. A. Schematic representation of the one-round trust game (TG). In the one-370 
round TG, the investor received an initial endowment that she could share with a second player, 371 
i.e., the trustee. If the investor decided to trust, the amount was tripled and passed on to the 372 
trustee who could decide whether to reciprocate by sending back part of the tripled amount 373 
received. B. In the TG, participants played one round with each trustee whose picture was 374 
presented on the screen. Participants made their decisions on a scale from 0 (sharing nothing) 375 
to 10 monetary units (sharing the entire initial endowment). No time limits were given for the 376 
decisions and presentation of trustees’ pictures was separated by an interstimulus interval (ISI) 377 
of 0.5s. Finally, after the TG, participants rated the trustworthiness (C.) and attractiveness of 378 
the trustees (D.). Trustworthiness and attractiveness ratings were presented in randomized 379 
order. 380 
 381 
Fig. 2. Trust Game and Ratings Results. Facial trustworthiness significantly impacted 382 
trusting behavior in the trust game (A.). Moreover, participants’ trustworthiness ratings (C.) 383 
indicate that our manipulation of their subjective, trustworthiness impressions was successful 384 
independently of their attractiveness impressions (B.). 385 
***p < .001; ns., nonsignificant. 386 
 387 
Fig. 3. Ratings Results. Trustworthiness ratings show that participants’ subjective impressions 388 
about the other’s trustworthiness interacted with the face’s gender, with trustworthy-looking 389 
female faces being perceived as more trustworthy than trustworthy-looking male faces and the 390 
opposite effect for untrustworthy-looking faces (A.). Female faces were further perceived as 391 
more attractive than male faces (B.). 392 





































































Fig. 4. Pramipexole’s Effects on Trust. Across facial trustworthiness, participants trusted the 395 
partner significantly less after pramipexole intake (A.). Moreover, such dopamine agonist 396 
effects on behavioral trust interacted with participants’ contraceptive use, with increased trust 397 
after pramipexole intake in women using hormonal contraceptives and decreased trust in non-398 
users (B.). 399 
* p < .05 400 
 401 
Fig. 5. Interaction between Attractiveness Impressions and Contraceptive Use. Although 402 
attractiveness impressions did not differ across facial trustworthiness, women using hormonal 403 
contraceptive perceived trustworthy-looking faces are as more attractive than non-users. The 404 
opposite effect was found for untrustworthy-looking faces. 405 
* p < .05 406 
 407 
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Tab. S1. Model selection 
 
 
Model N° fixed-effects 
parameters 
Model AIC 
Trust Game Trustworthiness Attractiveness 
1 6 2,498 2,261 2,432 
2 7 2,495 2,262 2,434 
3 7 2,499 2,262 2,430 
4 7 2,499 2,261 2,433 
5 7 2,507 2,265 2,440 
6 7 2,508 2,274 2,445 
7 7 2,505 2,260 2,434 
8 8 2,511 2,275 2,449 
9 8 2,519 2,283 2,456 
10 9 2,516 2,285 2,458 
11 10 2,524 2,287 2,463 
12 10 2,504 2,276 2,450 
13 10 2,505 2,273 2,442 
14 10 2,509 2,264 2,435 
15 13 2,518 2,288 2,461 
16 13 2,515 2,280 2,454 
17 13 2,515 2,276 2,448 
18 15 2,518 2,293 2,467 
 
Each model contained a fixed-effects intercept in addition to the fixed-effects regressors of 
























β coefficients (standard errors, SE) from the winning mixed-effects 
regression model for participants’ trusting behavior in the trust 
game. 
 




Regressors β (SE) 
Intercept 4.64 (1.27)*** 
Treatment -0.98 (0.38)* 
Gender 0.05 (0.20) 
Trustworthiness levels 0.60 (0.13)*** 
Contraceptive use -0.46 (0.78) 
Session -0.30 (0.78) 
Treatment * Contraceptive use 1.32 (0.49)** 



















β coefficients (standard errors, SE) from the winning mixed-effects 
regression model for participants’ ratings of trustee’s 
trustworthiness. 
 





Regressors β (SE) 
Intercept 4.16 (0.49)** 
Treatment -0.13 (0.10) 
Gender -0.66 (0.29)* 
Trustworthiness levels 0.20 (0.21) 
Contraceptive use -0.002 (0.16) 
Session -0.20 (0.18) 
Gender * Trustworthiness levels 0.34 (0.13) * 



















β coefficients (standard errors, SE) from the winning mixed-effects 
regression model for participants’ trusting behavior in the trust 
game. 
 















Regressors β (SE) 
Intercept 3.78 (0.46)** 
Treatment -0.006 (0.12) 
Gender 0.30 (0.15)* 
Trustworthiness levels -0.02 (0.13) 
Contraceptive use -0.60 (0.35) 
Session -0.28 (0.19) 
Trustworthiness levels * 
Contraceptive use 
0.34 (0.16)* 
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